Tuesday, September 23, 2014

How Brussels' medicine is killing the ‘French patient’

The French government’s announcement in early September that France would fail to bring its deficit below 3 per cent of GDP until 2017 was met with the usual mixture of frustration and resignation. Many eurozone policy-makers see France’s refusal to play by the fiscal rules and its inability to reform its economy as the biggest threat to the eurozone’s stability. The list of allegations is pretty comprehensive: a bloated state, a lack of competitiveness, intractable structural problems and a mulish refusal to reform or to acknowledge that globalisation has left France living on borrowed time.

Some of these criticisms have merit, but as a whole they form little more than a caricature. France has some supply-side problems: very high non-wage labour costs deter employment; and parts of the service sector urgently need an injection of competition. But these are secondary to those of its problems that stem from self-defeating austerity and chronically weak domestic demand elsewhere in the eurozone. Without change to the latter France could yet come to justify the ‘sick man of Europe’ tag so beloved of journalists.

How does the performance of the French economy stack up against its European contemporaries? France has certainly struggled since the financial crisis, along with the rest of the eurozone (with the partial exception of Germany). However, its growth performance has been nowhere near as bad as either Spain’s or Italy’s and, until recently, it has been better than the UK’s (see chart 1). And France’s record since 1999 has been rather good compared with many of its European peers. So much for past performance. Are critics of France (led by the European Commission and the German government) justified? Are they right to be so pessimistic about the country’s future and correct in the medicine they prescribe for it?

Chart 1: Economic growth (1999 – 2014)
Source: Haver

France certainly has a big state. Public spending stood at almost 57 per cent of GDP in 2012, higher even than in Sweden (see chart 2). There is little doubt that this is excessive, but France’s productivity levels (which are better than Germany’s and not far short of US levels) would not be so high if its large state sector was unproductive. Nor does the country’s big state appear to squeeze out private sector investment, which is about the same level as in Germany, Spain and Italy and much higher than in the UK (see chart 3). Moreover, putting together comparable data for the size of state sectors is far from straightforward. For example, spending by France’s state-owned rail operator (SNCF) counts as state spending, whereas spending by Britain’s (or Germany’s) nominally privatised railways does not. France could follow suit and sell off its railways, but it is far from clear that this would improve the quality of rail services or reduce the public’s liabilities.

Chart 2: General government spending, per cent GDP

Source: Haver 

Chart 3: Private sector investment

Source: Haver 

France’s general government budget deficit is sizeable (see chart 4), though much lower than Spain’s or the UK’s. Moreover, a sizeable chunk of the French deficit is down to much higher public investment than in the other big EU economies, and more generous childcare. For example, were French public investment as low as Germany’s, France would have no problem getting its fiscal deficit under 3 per cent of GDP. And generous childcare provision may help explain why France has the highest birth rate in the EU after Ireland. This could look like money well spent in a few years when populations start to age rapidly in many other EU countries, notably Germany and Italy.

Chart 4: Budget balances

Source: Haver

Is France really as uncompetitive as all that? The country’s share of world export markets has certainly fallen steadily over the last 15 years, but no faster than in other G7 economies, with the notable exception of Germany (see chart 5). France’s exports (like those of other G7 countries) have risen considerably but their share of the total has fallen as China and other big emerging economies have entered the global trading system. Germany has bucked this trend, but this is hardly a strategy all can emulate: if more countries become fully participating members of the trade system, Western countries’ overall share must inevitably fall.

Chart 5: Shares of global export markets

Source: OECD

France has run small current account deficits for much of the last decade (see chart 6). The principal reason is that domestic demand rose almost twice as fast in France in the 1999-2013 period as it did in the eurozone, with Germany accounting for much of the weakness of eurozone domestic demand. Persistent weakness in Germany – France’s biggest single export market – has been a continuing problem for French exporters. And while German domestic demand has strengthened gradually since 2010, this has been eclipsed by a much bigger combined fall in Italian and Spanish domestic demand, two of France’s other major export destinations.

Chart 6: Current account balances

Source: Haver

Which brings us onto the second reason for the deterioration in France’s trade performance: French exporters’ loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis their German counterparts. This has not come about because French costs have risen too rapidly (see chart 7), but as a result of prolonged wage restraint in Germany, where wages have lagged behind productivity growth. This was initially the product of a depressed German economy and then of structural changes in the German labour markets brought about by the so-called Hartz IV reforms introduced in January 2005.  German wage settlements have picked up a bit over the last year, but not by enough to make a dent in the gap that has opened up since the introduction of the euro.

Chart 7: ECB’s harmonised competitiveness indices (minus indicates increased competitiveness)

Source: ECB

Critics of France are on firmer ground when it comes to the supply-side of the French economy. Although France’s productivity levels are impressive, there are some significant structural problems. The first is that French unemployment is higher than it should be given the country’s growth performance and moderate wage growth (see chart 8). One reason is that the costs of financing social benefits are loaded too heavily onto employers, pushing up the cost of hiring people. Another is the inflexibility of labour contracts, which can deter employment. Successive French governments have introduced reforms to address these issues, such as reducing the cost of social insurance paid by employers, but more will need to be done, in particular to reduce the costs of employing low-skilled people.

Chart 8: Unemployment

Source: Haver

France also requires reform of various service industries. IMF data for total factor productivity – a measure of the efficiency of all inputs into the production process – suggest that the biggest problems lie in sectors such as accounting, legal services, insurance and logistics. The lack of competition and barriers to entry in these sectors mean that costs are higher than they should be, hitting overall business competitiveness.

To recap, the French economy is in trouble. It has barely grown for the last two years and unemployment is stuck at near record levels. But France has performed pretty well in a eurozone context. It stacks up favourably not only compared with the currency union’s periphery but also with the likes of the Netherlands and Finland. France’s supply-side problems are no doubt significant, but do not justify its status as some kind of hopeless case. They are certainly not as serious as those faced by Italy, and arguably no worse overall than those of Germany and the UK, although they are in different areas. Nor will France’s economic prospects be improved by adhering to the European Commission’s calls for austerity, wage restraint and labour market reforms which, if heeded, would exacerbate unemployment.

Since 2012 France has tightened fiscal policy considerably in a largely unsuccessful attempt to bring down its deficit. This failure was foreseen: the IMF has demonstrated that the so-called fiscal multipliers (the impact of changes in government spending on economic activity) are very large in today’s depressed European economic environment. Although spending has been cut, the resulting weakening of economic activity (and hence inflation) has meant that the deficit has fallen little. A long-term objective for the French government should be to reduce the ratio of government spending to GDP, but this can only happen once the economy is growing again. Further cuts to public spending now would further damage the economy by causing even competitive firms to go under and eroding physical and social infrastructure, for example by pushing more people into long-term unemployment.

Wage growth has fallen sharply in France as high unemployment has undercut private employees’ bargaining power and public sector wage freezes have come into force. However, such wage restraint has had little impact on the price competitiveness of French exports, because French wage restraint has been exceeded by the likes of Spain and Italy and matched by Germany. Even if France could depress wages relative to other eurozone economies, it would take a long time for that to bring about a big boost to France’s economy because exports account for less than 30 per cent of French GDP (as opposed to 40 per cent in Germany in the early 2000s, or over 100 per cent in Ireland today). In addition, further wage restraint would depress household consumption and prove a zero-sum game in terms of export competitiveness since Italy and Spain are attempting the same thing. It would also exacerbate deflationary pressures in the French economy and across the eurozone (see chart 9). Rather than cuts in its own wages, what France desperately needs is a sustained recovery in German wages (and with it, German domestic demand).

Chart 9: Core consumer price inflation

Source: ECB

The French government should certainly push ahead with structural reforms of its economy, but not necessarily those prescribed by the European Commission. When demand is very weak and firms do not need to hire workers, reducing social protection and wages increases unemployment rather than reducing it, and depresses consumption. However, France should reduce the burden of taxation from labour and transfer more of it to wealth, property and carbon consumption. And it should open up the country’s non-tradable services sector to greater competition. But even structural reforms of this kind will do little to increase economic growth without a change to fiscal policy, aggressive measures by the ECB to reflate the eurozone economy as a whole and concerted action by the German government to rebalance Germany’s economy.

France is not the ‘sick man of Europe’, but it is certainly ailing thanks to the medicine prescribed by Brussels and Berlin. The French government needs to step up its resistance. Indeed, perhaps the most serious charge that can be laid at France’s door is that it has meekly gone along with a eurozone policy doctrine that has done so much damage to the French economy rather than corralling opposition to it and forcing through a change in direction.

Simon Tilford is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.

Friday, September 12, 2014

A UK without Scotland

If Scotland votes Yes…
At the time of writing it seems possible that the Scots will vote to leave the UK in the referendum on September 18th. The consequences of a Yes to independence are unfathomable but would stretch far beyond the British Isles. A Yes would not only shake up British politics but also increase the likelihood of Residual UK (RUK) leaving the EU, boost separatism elsewhere in Europe and diminish the global standing of what was left of Britain.

A Scottish exit would create problems for the Conservative Party. This would be the second time that it had been responsible for the departure of part of the British Isles from the United Kingdom. Ireland became independent in 1922, but it is often forgotten that when the Irish asked for Home Rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, most of them did not want independence. On several occasions Liberal governments tried to give Ireland Home Rule but were blocked by Conservatives in the House of Lords. This went on for decades, eventually driving the Irish (excepting the Protestants in Northern Ireland) to seek independence.

The Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, will take some of the blame if the Scots leave. He agreed to the timetable of Scotland’s first minister, Alex Salmond (a vote in 2014 rather than 2013 allowed the Scottish National Party more time to build support); to a ballot paper question which, though modified by the Electoral Commission, is favourable to the SNP (‘Should Scotland be an independent country’); and to the exclusion of further devolution as a third option on the ballot (which would have reduced the numbers voting Yes).

The austerity policies of the Cameron government must also bear some responsibility for the Conservatives’ appalling image in Scotland. One of the most potent arguments for independence is that Britain is an increasingly right-wing, Thatcherite and inegalitarian country. Much of that is hyperbole, but the nationalists have been able to argue that if Scotland wants to emulate modern, high-principled and social-democratic Nordic countries, it must break free of Tory Britain.

Cameron would come under pressure to resign, but he might limp on as a lame duck prime minister, even less capable of controlling his party’s powerful eurosceptic forces. If Cameron resigned his replacement would probably need to take a more anti-EU stance in order to be elected party leader. The party could move towards making radical demands for EU reform that other EU governments would not or could not grant; the upshot would be the Conservatives recommending a No in a referendum on maintaining EU membership.

Ed Miliband, the Labour leader, would also be damaged by a Yes. He is scarcely more popular in Scotland than Cameron. The recent surge in support for the Yes campaign has come mainly from Labour voters in working class areas. They do not regard the prospect of another Labour government at Westminster, with Miliband as prime minister, as exciting. The referendum is only happening because Labour – traditionally, the dominant force in Scotland – became so grey and uninspiring that the SNP was able to win office in 2007.

But whatever the failings of Cameron and Miliband, the Scottish campaign reflects larger, pan-European trends. In many parts of Europe, populism, much of it nationalist, is on the rise. In Britain, in the recent European elections, Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party won more votes than the Conservative or Labour parties. Salmond’s SNP is different from UKIP in important ways: it lacks the latter’s hostility to the EU and immigration. But they both tap the same hostility to Westminster, elites and established political parties (Farage and Salmond have also both expressed qualified praise for Vladimir Putin). And though many of those working for a Yes are young and idealistic, in favour of a new sort of politics, their campaign, like UKIP, is gaining strong support from those who are less educated and fearful for their futures.

RUK would be more right-wing and eurosceptic than the full United Kingdom and thus more likely to leave the EU. The Conservative Party has long described itself as a unionist party but has only one Scottish MP, eight in Wales and does not contest elections in Northern Ireland. A party that was more centred on England, seeing UKIP as a key foe, would probably become more unashamedly for English nationalism.

Even if Ed Miliband won the general election in May 2015 his government would have little legitimacy, if his majority depended on Scottish MPs, as it almost certainly would. There would probably have to be another general election when Scotland left the UK, which SNP claims would happen in March 2016.  Labour would find it much harder to win a parliamentary majority without Scottish seats in Parliament. So a Scottish Yes would increase the chances of a Conservative government, and thus an EU referendum (Labour, like the Liberal Democrats, opposes a referendum unless more powers are transferred to the EU). And without five million relatively pro-European Scots, it would be harder for pro-EU voters in RUK to defeat the sceptics in a referendum.

British pro-Europeans who hope to win such a referendum will learn some lessons from the Scottish campaign. When middle-aged men in suits tell voters that departure will lead to less foreign direct investment and economic instability, many of them are unimpressed. Advice from the establishment can often seem patronising. The No campaign in Scotland has focused on economics and attempted to make people fear the unknown. Only belatedly has it tried to tell a positive story of how all parts of the union benefit from it.

The obvious lesson for an EU referendum is that pro-Europeans should not focus only on economics and negativity. However, it is much harder to create a positive narrative about the EU than about Great Britain. The English and Scots share a common history and have achieved a great deal together; they have not fought since the battle of Culloden in 1746. But it is only 70 years since Britain was fighting other Europeans, and the achievements of the EU – such as peace and prosperity – appear not to touch many British hearts.

A Scottish Yes would cause shockwaves elsewhere in the EU, particularly in countries with separatist movements. Catalan separatists already treat the Scottish referendum – whatever its result – as a victory, since Scotland is being allowed to vote. The Catalan government, led by Artur Mas and his moderate Convergencia i Unio party, wants a referendum in November 2014, but the Partido Popular government in Madrid has refused to allow it. This obstinacy is pushing more and more Catalans to favour independence.

If the Madrid government and the constitutional court continue to block the referendum, Mas may try to hold one anyway or simply call Catalan elections. Financial scandals have weakened Convergencia i Unio, so the more extreme Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya would stand a good chance of forming a government. This party has promised to declare independence if a referendum is not allowed. A Scottish Yes would surely embolden the Catalans, encourage more of them to insist on independence, and make Spain’s constitutional crisis more intractable. What happens in Scotland and Catalonia will make its mark on the Basque country, Flanders and other parts of the EU.

A Scotland that leaves the UK would have to apply for EU membership. The accession of an independent Scotland would be much more complicated, and take much longer, than the SNP imagines. As John Kerr has pointed out, Scotland could not accede until it had agreed terms with each of the 28 member-states, all of which would have to ratify the accession treaty. It would be technically very difficult, though hopefully not impossible, to ensure that Scottish citizens and companies did not lose the benefits of membership during the period between Scotland’s quitting the UK and joining the EU.

Many issues between the EU and Scotland could not be sorted out until RUK and Scotland had agreed the terms of their separation. The currency question would be a problem in both sets of negotiations. Scotland could not join the EU without committing to join the euro. But if it wished to regard that as a long-term goal and in the interim to have its own currency or use the pound, EU member-states might indulge it. London, however, would not agree to Scotland using the pound and having the Bank of England as its lender of last resort unless Edinburgh ceded substantial powers over economic policy.

Like any country applying to join the club, Scotland would find that it had to accept the terms imposed on it by the other member-states and EU institutions. For example, Scotland would not get a share of the UK’s rebate on its contribution to the EU budget. Spain would be one member in no hurry to allow Scotland to show that independence can be won easily and quickly (and it might extract a price in fishing rights).

At the same time as the difficult RUK-Scotland and EU-Scotland talks were under way, a Tory-led RUK could be trying to negotiate a new deal with the EU and, following a referendum in 2017, perhaps an exit. The EU could put the Scots on hold while it sorted out the (for most governments) much bigger problem of RUK’s departure.

Whether or not RUK stayed in the EU, a Scottish exit would diminish its international standing. In the past few years that standing has suffered.  The Conservative-led government has been less assertive in international affairs than its Labour predecessors, partly because public opinion has become sceptical of an activist foreign policy (after Tony Blair’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), and partly because of the Conservatives’ reluctance to pursue international goals through the EU. Britain has been relatively passive during the Ukraine/Russia crisis (at least its early phases) and the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East.

But the departure of the Scots would cause much greater damage. Other countries would react with a mixture of pity and derision.  RUK’s armed forces and diplomatic service – already under pressure from government budget cuts – would have to shrink further, hampering its ability to play a leading role in NATO and the EU. As the details of independence were negotiated – including the need to divide up all common assets – the RUK government could find it hard to focus on foreign policy crises at the same time.

The SNP is committed to getting rid of the Trident submarines that are based at Faslane on the Clyde. But the cost of constructing a new submarine base in England would be enormous – and perhaps tilt the argument in London, where the political class is increasingly divided on the wisdom of retaining a nuclear deterrent, towards scrapping it. Any decision to abandon or diminish the deterrent would lower the US’s estimation of RUK. All these shifts would make it harder for Britain to argue that it should maintain its place on the UN Security Council (though it cannot be forced to cede it). The UK’s permanent seat and veto already appear to be an anachronism, when the likes of India, Brazil, Germany and Japan have neither.

Even if – as the CER hopes – Scotland votes No, there will still be huge consequences. A No is unlikely to be the end of the matter, especially if the vote is close, as is likely. Although 60 per cent of the Québecois voted to stay in Canada in 1980, another referendum was held 15 years later, which the separatists lost by only a whisker.

The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have promised that a No vote will trigger the devolution of tax-raising and other powers to the Scottish Parliament. That, in turn, is likely to provoke rising resentment among the English. If the Scots get special deals, why should they not? Further devolution would increase the urgency of answering the ‘Lothian Question’: why should Scottish MPs at Westminster vote on subjects that are devolved to Edinburgh, when English MPs cannot vote on those issues in Scotland? Meanwhile the Welsh and perhaps some other regions would ask for more powers to be devolved. UKIP would do its best to profit from a sense of grievance among the English.

The rise of populism and nationalism will continue to destabilise Britain and the rest of Europe – unless traditional elites do a better job of solving economic problems and practising the kind of politics that inspires voters.

Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform.

Wednesday, September 03, 2014

The challenge to the West: Restoring European deterrence

Mutually Assured Destruction, with its overtones of Dr Strangelove, was never a popular strategy in Western societies: the idea that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could wipe out human life many times over seemed immoral to many people. The acronym ‘MAD’ did not help. But MAD kept Europe peaceful, if nervous, through most of the Cold War.

The world of 2014 is very different from that of the 1950s, when John von Neumann, mathematician and game theorist, came up with the both concept and the term Mutually Assured Destruction. NATO leaders at their summit in Wales on September 4th and 5th, and EU foreign ministers when they meet on September 29th, need to think about an expanded concept of deterrence, covering military, economic and other measures, and how to use it to restore stability in Europe.

Deterrence depends on having both the capability and the will to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential enemy. The West certainly has the capability. In the military field, despite the huge increase in Russia’s defence budget under President Vladimir Putin (in real terms, it almost tripled from 2000 to 2012), the US and its NATO allies could defeat Russia in any conventional war. The US alone is numerically superior to Russia in every category of major weapons system except for main battle tanks, not to mention its technological dominance.  Russia could reduce the US to radioactive dust, as TV anchor Dmitri Kiselyov, later promoted to head the Russia Today state news agency, said in March 2014; but the US still has more than enough warheads to do the same to Russia.

Economically, the EU can inflict enormous damage on Russia. More than half of Russia’s state budget revenue derives from sales of oil and gas. EU countries buy 84 per cent of Russia’s oil exports and 76 per cent of its gas exports. Even small reductions in purchases would hit the Russian economy hard, and would make it more difficult for the Russian government to pay for increased defence and social spending.

The problem is that Western leaders have repeatedly shown since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis that they do not have the will to use the means available to stop gross violations of international law by Russia. Putin is exploiting the resulting security vacuum on NATO’s and the EU’s eastern border. And Western irresolution also risks encouraging other states to think that they can seize territory by force without any significant Western reaction – think of China in the South and East China Seas, where the credibility of US security guarantees is increasingly questioned, as Rem Korteweg wrote in a recent CER policy brief.

NATO’s deterrent posture worked during the Cold War because Soviet leaders really believed that successive US Presidents were prepared to launch massive nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union in response to Warsaw Pact attacks on NATO forces in Europe. Just in case there was any doubt, NATO exercised its procedures for using nuclear weapons regularly. Soviet leaders knew that, and the knowledge kept them honest: they wanted at all costs to avoid a European conflict that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Western leaders had similar fears about the Warsaw Pact. Among the results of this shared fear were various hotlines and confidence-building agreements designed to ensure that the two sides never stumbled into war.

Once the Cold War was over, this sort of thinking seemed out of place: what Western leader would sit down with his Russian counterpart to discuss co-operation on Afghanistan, or investment in Russia’s oil and gas sector, while simultaneously threatening to obliterate Russia in the event of conflict? The result was that when Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, three months after the Alliance had promised Tbilisi NATO membership (albeit at some unspecified future date), the Allies did nothing to help Georgia. Deterrence had broken down: and Putin no longer believed, or feared, that the West would impose an unacceptable cost for his adventurism.

The same pattern has been repeated in Ukraine. Western leaders have been too ready to say that there is no military solution to the conflict. There is – the Russian army is busy imposing it in Donetsk and Luhansk. The West has become the victim of unilateral deterrence on Putin’s terms: it has limited its action against Russia to measures that will not impose unacceptable costs and will not invite significant retaliation, and Putin has not been deterred at all by small, tit-for-tat steps. Estimates for how much Germany, Europe’s biggest exporter to Russia, may lose from the sanctions imposed so far range from 0.04 per cent of GDP to around 0.25 per cent (the latter figure coming from the business lobby with most at stake in Russia).

On one level this is understandable: European economies are fragile, so even small losses of business in Russia are unwelcome; and if Russia turned off the gas taps, a few Central European countries would freeze next winter. As for military deterrence, Russia is a nuclear power (and just in case anyone had forgotten that, Putin has warned in two recent statements that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations and that it will surprise the West “with new developments in offensive nuclear weapons”); so why would anyone seek to change its behaviour by military means?

But the breakdown of deterrence is a serious threat to the European order which NATO has defended and the EU has helped to build and has benefited from. NATO and EU treaty obligations end at their eastern borders; their security interests in stable and prosperous neighbours do not. Though NATO talks of rapid reaction forces supported by pre-positioned equipment and supplies in Central Europe and the Baltic States, this is designed to protect existing allies, not countries like Ukraine and Georgia. Even in exposed countries like the Baltic States, there will be no permanently-stationed NATO forces. Germany and others worry that such forces would breach the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. In this, NATO stated “that in the current and foreseeable security environment” it would carry out its missions without resorting to “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”. Though the security environment has changed beyond recognition, the fear of provoking Russia has not.

The breakdown of deterrence has emboldened Putin to go ever further into Ukraine, while President Obama and others have been at pains to assure him that there is no risk that Russia will have to confront NATO forces there, or even Ukrainian forces with NATO armaments and equipment. An independent, democratic country that has had its problems but always had internal ethnic peace is gradually being dismantled by Russia. And the West, far from supporting Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself, is encouraging it to agree a ceasefire on the aggressor’s terms.

Restoring deterrence in Europe now will be much harder than maintaining it would have been even six months ago. But the longer Western leaders wait, the worse the consequences will be. Putin’s recent speeches, with their references to Russia’s obligation to defend not only Russian citizens abroad but ethnic Russians and “those who feel that they are part of the broad Russian world”, as he said to Russian Ambassadors on July 1st, point to the danger that he will interfere in other countries besides Ukraine. Why, after what has happened (or not happened) in Ukraine, should Putin believe that NATO countries will really deliver on their security guarantees to the Baltic States? Latvia and Estonia have substantial ethnic Russian minorities; no doubt Russian intelligence services could stir up enough of them to provide a pretext for some sort of peacekeeping intervention. Would there be unanimity in the North Atlantic Council for going to war to defend Riga or Tallinn?

The NATO Summit in Newport should borrow some fire from the Welsh dragon and come up with a package of military assistance for Ukraine to make Russia reconsider the costs and benefits of invading Ukraine. The Ukrainians need training, logistics, intelligence and equipment if they are to push Russian forces and their local proxies back. There are Central European allies who still have former Soviet equipment of a kind that Ukrainian troops will be familiar with; they should send it to Ukraine, perhaps as part of a lend-lease scheme. Germany has decided to send arms to the Kurds, to help them defeat the terrorists of the Islamic State; it should also arm the Ukrainians to help them withstand the Russian invasion, as should the UK. France should (belatedly) stop the delivery of its Mistral assault ships to Russia; it is unconscionable to arm the aggressor while refusing to help the victim.

At the same time, the EU should overcome its fear of short-term economic losses and Russian retaliation, and defend its long-term values and interests with sweeping and painful sanctions. Russia’s economy is in as bad a state as that of the eurozone and even less able to adapt to shocks. Even a modest reduction in Europe’s purchases of gas, oil and coal from Russia would have a major impact on Moscow’s finances.

The Union should follow through on the implicit threat in the conclusions of the European Council on August 30th to sanction “every person and institution dealing with the separatist groups in the Donbass”. EU legislation defines as terrorist offences “intentional acts… that may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of… seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.” By that definition, the groups in the east are terrorists, and the EU should treat them and their backers as such. And it should exclude from European markets any company, Russian or foreign, which does business in Crimea without the permission of the Ukrainian government.

The EU should also take up British prime minister David Cameron’s reported proposal that Russian banks should be shut out of the SWIFT inter-bank payments system. This was one of the most effective sanctions applied to Iran to get it to suspend its nuclear weapons programme. Though Russian officials have talked about setting up a national system outside SWIFT, this would not be easy, and the short-term damage to Russia’s trade and corporate borrowing, as well as the disruption to the lives of high-net worth Russians with large overseas assets, would be severe.

Whatever steps the West takes, Russia will without doubt retaliate. But if the West does nothing, it cannot expect that Russia will allow Ukraine to go back to the status quo ante, or that Putin will be satisfied with annexing Crimea. EU economies will still suffer from the destabilisation of Ukraine, the disruption of trade with it and through it, and conceivably from large refugee flows if fighting continues (the UN High Commissioner on Refugees has reported that this year 20,000 Ukrainians have arrived in one (unnamed) Baltic state alone); and the West will be in an even weaker political position to face Putin’s next provocation.

Putin, as he has shown, is prepared to sacrifice a lot in order to dominate Ukraine, including an unknown number of Russian troops already killed in action. As he famously admitted in 2000, he received a negative character assessment in KGB training for his “lowered sense of danger”; but it is quite likely that at least some of his advisers have a better understanding of the damage Russia could suffer if the West ramps up the economic and military pressure. Germany’s intelligence chief reportedly told members of the Bundestag in July that splits were appearing among Putin’s backers, between oligarchs and security services.  Good. To widen those splits, the EU and NATO have to show that they are also prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of the European order. Deterrence can only be restored if the aggressor believes that the defender is ready to tolerate pain as well as inflicting it.

Ian Bond is director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform.

Thursday, August 21, 2014

Learning from Herman: A handbook for the European Council president

When member-states reconvene on August 30th in Brussels to decide on the remaining top EU posts, they should agree on candidates who not only have the right party affiliation, nationality or gender, but who can also respond to the EU’s mounting challenges. This applies to the President of the European Council, whose role is to forge a consensus among EU leaders — a difficult task these days. But the appointment of a successor to Herman Van Rompuy has so far been overshadowed by political squabbles around Federica Mogherini, the Italian foreign minister and candidate for the post of High Representative.

Many still believe that the job of the European Council president is nothing more than European ‘master of ceremonies’. This is wrong. The sovereign debt crisis elevated the European Council to the primary forum for EU discussions on economic governance. It also increased the importance of its permanent president. Van Rompuy has had his hands full ever since, trying to reconcile the divergent interests of debtor and creditor countries. The bar has been set high for Van Rompuy’s successor, who is expected to take over on December 1st. One of Van Rompuy’s last tasks will be to find a candidate able to get the European Council working as a team. Van Rompuy would do well to look in the mirror, draw up a list of his strengths and weaknesses, and seek a successor with some of his own best characteristics.

Efficient chairman. Despite a reputation for having the “charisma of a damp rag”, as Nigel Farage once put it, Van Rompuy made European Council meetings more efficient. He used concise conclusions to set out a strategic direction for the EU. The strategic agenda which EU leaders endorsed in June is a case in point. It identified priority areas which the EU should focus on in the course of the next five years. But the European Council has not always remained at the strategic level. It suggested deleting two articles from a draft regulation on the creation of unitary patent protection, despite in theory exercising no legislative powers. Not everyone liked Van Rompuy’s agenda management either. He pushed for the most sensitive and technical issues to be discussed over meals. This has been a headache for advisers, who had limited contact with their leaders at mealtimes. But trying to build consensus in the informal setting of a meal may have helped to overcome impasses, for example on the question of imposing a ‘haircut’ on holders of Greek bonds in order to reduce its debt. As there are still decisions to be made about euro governance and a settlement with the British to negotiate, a new president should keep Van Rompuy’s tactics up his or her sleeve.

Sensitive to concerns of euro ‘outs’ and ‘pre-ins’. Van Rompuy is an economist by profession, and this helped him to keep the European Council in the driving seat in discussions on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Deliberations among all 28 EU leaders have limited any shift in the centre of gravity towards decision-making in the format of eurozone only. Van Rompuy, who initially gained a reputation for leaning too much towards Franco-German views, has developed a sensitivity towards the concerns of member-states that are not in the eurozone. In particular, the ‘pre-ins’ who are yet to adopt the common currency have a vital interest in long term arrangements in the eurozone. Member-states such as Poland therefore welcomed the decision to have the president of the European Council also chair euro summits as a small step towards greater transparency in the eurozone. But one might wonder if this arrangement can continue if Van Rompuy’s successor does not come from a euro ‘in’ country. It could well serve as an invitation to the French to renew their advocacy of the eurozone-only format.

Moderate on macroeconomics. The eurozone failed to register growth in the second quarter of the year and Italy slid back into recession. This will almost certainly bring the debate on ways to provide economic stimulus back to the EU leaders’ level. A new European Council president will find it very difficult to bridge divergent views on eurozone matters; anyone with strong views on either side of the stimulus debate will not get the job. The best that Van Rompuy can do is to focus on candidates who do not come from a major debtor or creditor country and are not closely associated with a particular view on macroeconomic policy.

Assertive towards the European Parliament. On paper, the European Council president should only report to the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) after EU leaders' meetings. But Van Rompuy understood the importance of nurturing relations with MEPs, who together with the EU Council exercise EU legislative powers. Yet he avoided setting any precedents which might give them even more power. He firmly resisted calls by the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, for a seat at the European Council. Now that the European Council, by endorsing Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission president, has effectively accepted the Spitzenkandidaten process, the European Parliament is hungry for more influence. The European Council, and its deliberations on EU economic governance, is next on the menu. But the Parliament has its own legitimacy problem: fewer and fewer people vote, and support for Eurosceptic movements is on the rise. It is a bad time for the Parliament to demand more power. The next European Council president should, like Van Rompuy, keep the MEPs at arm’s length. Instead, he or she should champion a debate on how to plug national parliaments better into EU policy-making.

Good mediator with a small ego. Van Rompuy proved to be an efficient honest broker. In 2013 he managed to reconcile the interests of net contributors to and beneficiaries of the EU budget, and strike a fair deal on the long-term financing of the Union. But seeking consensus among EU leaders is a difficult balancing act, even for a president who is held in high regard and who has the ability to keep personal ambitions in check. The European Council in December 2011 illustrates it. Ultimately, Van Rompuy could not prevent David Cameron, the British prime minister, from vetoing a revision of the EU treaties to introduce stricter discipline on member-states’ budgets. Cameron arrived in Brussels with a wish list, on which he would not compromise. Van Rompuy's successor will have to deal with failures he cannot be blamed for and broker deals without claiming credit for them.

Critical but understanding of the British. If Van Rompuy were asked what made his job particularly challenging, he would probably point to the ‘British question’. In his Bloomberg speech in January 2013, David Cameron announced a radical redefinition of the UK’s relationship with the EU. Should the UK seek a renegotiation of its membership after the next general election, in May 2015, the European Council will be the primary forum for deciding whether to revise the EU treaties and consider Cameron’s wish list of reforms. The contenders for Van Rompuy’s job should have a good understanding of the dynamics of Britain’s engagement with Europe, and where to look for common ground with other member-states.

Finding a candidate that matches this profile will not be easy. It will be even harder because of competing demands for ‘balance’. The European Council will be expected to give one of the two top jobs to a representative of the Party of European Socialists (since Juncker is from the centre-right European People’s Party). The centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, despite losses in the May elections, would like a reward for their pivotal role in the EU legislative process. There will be criticism if none of the top posts goes to a woman. And Van Rompuy will also have to deal with the insistence of the Central European countries that they are no longer junior partners and should hold one of the top posts. The EU, beset by crises, has no time to train a novice, so Van Rompuy’s successor should ideally be a current or former European Council member.

Names that would fit most of the criteria and are probably on Van Rompuy’s list already include Donald Tusk (Poland), Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Denmark), Valdis Dombrovskis (former Latvian prime minister) and Andrus Ansip (former Estonian prime minister). Dombrovskis and Ansip have now been nominated by their countries to be Commissioners. This does not rule out the possibility that one of them could emerge as a late compromise candidate, but it suggests that the Latvian and Estonian governments do not expect them to be chosen.

That would leave Tusk and Thorning-Schmidt. The fact that neither comes from a euro ‘in’ country counts against them. Some member-states may fear that it would be harder for them to insist on keeping the eurozone discussions at the level of the 28 rather than the 18. These concerns are not shared in London. And David Cameron feels that Thorning-Schmidt would be more responsive to British concerns than Tusk.

Tusk’s advantage is that Poland is committed to adopt the euro in the future, whereas Denmark has a permanent opt-out. His appointment would also recognise Poland’s rapid economic and political progress since joining the EU. Tusk enjoys friendly relations with Angela Merkel. On the other hand, the German chancellor values him as a reliable counterpart in neighbouring Poland, and as such she may prefer that Tusk stays at home for now. Merkel also wants to keep the UK in the EU. She will support a candidate who can best tick the ‘British question’ box. These two points tip the balance towards the Danish candidate.

If Denmark’s euro ‘out’ status makes Thorning-Schmidt unacceptable to some member-states, Van Rompuy should be ready to twist some more arms, like that of Enda Kenny, the Irish taoiseach. He comes from a euro ‘in’ country, and enjoys good relations with the British. Ireland has completed the financial assistance programme and has a liberal economic outlook, but needs policies that will boost growth. This may make Kenny acceptable to both the southern and northern blocs.

One final complication for Van Rompuy: he will have to secure unanimous support for his successor. The EU treaties allow a vote on the European Council president, but leaders will probably resist this way of breaking the impasse. A lack of unity would damage contenders’ credibility at home and in Brussels, a risk that active politicians are unwilling to take. So brokering a consensus among the 28 over his successor is likely to be the final and biggest test for Van Rompuy’s conciliation skills.

Agata Gostyńska is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

Monday, August 11, 2014

Boris Johnson, Gerard Lyons and policy-based evidence making

The UK can only achieve serious reform if it is serious about leaving, and it can only be serious about leaving if it believes this is better than the status quo of staying in an unreformed EU. It is.

– Gerard Lyons, ‘The Europe report: A win-win situation’

In recent years, policy wonks have led a campaign championing ‘evidence-based policy making’. A new policy should only be put in place after it has been rigorously weighed against the evidence. If the evidence points in another direction, the policy should be ditched. This, of course, rarely happens: politicians have a pet project that they are convinced must be a good idea, and commission research that supports the project and ignores evidence to the contrary. British civil servants have come to call this ‘policy-based evidence making’. Nowhere is it more apparent than in Britain’s Europe debate: pro-Europeans and eurosceptics too easily throw around spurious GDP and jobs figures, often with weak or cherry-picked evidence, to support their case.

The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, is the latest culprit. He has ambitions to lead the British Conservative party, and on Wednesday, he made a speech laying out his preferred reforms to the EU. Although he was careful not to say it explicitly, the thrust of Johnson’s speech was that Britain would be better off leaving than staying in an unreformed EU. Such a stance would help him win a leadership contest, given growing euroscepticism among Conservative MPs.

However, “if we get the reforms,” Johnson said, “then I would frankly be happy to campaign for a yes to stay in”. He pointed to research published on the same day as the speech by his economic advisor, Gerard Lyons. The research considered the impact of EU withdrawal on London’s economy, and provided four costed scenarios:

  •  Stay in a reformed EU, which Lyons thinks would cause London’s economy to grow by 2.75 per cent a year, to £640 billion in 20 years. 
  • Leave the EU but with “goodwill” on both sides, and with the UK pursuing a “pro-growth, reform agenda”. This would cause London’s economy to grow by 2.5 per cent a year, to £615 billion in 2034.
  • Stay in an unreformed EU, with growth of 1.9 per cent a year and an economy of £495 billion in 20 years.
  • Leave the EU but pursue autarkic trade and subsidy policies, with 1.4 per cent growth leading to GDP of £430 billion. 

Johnson and Lyons think that London, and by extension the UK, would be best off in a reformed EU, but that leaving would be better than staying in the status quo. These figures, at first sight, seem implausible. Lyons argues that EU reforms could raise London’s growth rate by 45 per cent, and that the status quo is only slightly better than leaving the EU and pursuing autarkic trade policies.

What are the reforms that would lead to such impressive improvements in London’s growth rate? These were Boris Johnson’s suggestions: “complete the single market”; reform social and employment law to reduce costs to businesses; further reform of, or better, abolition of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); “managed migration so that we know how many people are coming in”; a yellow card procedure so that national parliaments can stop “unnecessary” regulations; and an “end to the pointless attacks on the City of London”.

Consider whether these reforms, some of which the CER would support, are likely to promote the rates of economic growth that Johnson and Lyons suggest.

  • The UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) estimates that completing the single market – by which BIS means a highly ambitious elimination of barriers to the trade in services – would boost British GDP by 7 per cent. If we spread that out over 20 years, that amounts to 0.35 per cent a year.
  • The CER Commission’s report on leaving the EU showed that EU social and employment rules do not prevent Britain from having one of the most flexible labour markets in the developed world; and that the negative impact of totemic rules like the Working Time Directive is small. There is little reason to believe that abolishing these rules upon EU withdrawal would have a large macroeconomic impact.
  • An abolition of the CAP would make little difference to London’s economy, since it has no farms that receive subsidies. A reduction of EU tariffs on agricultural products, on the other hand, might raise incomes by reducing Londoners’ shopping bills, but Johnson did not mention this.
  •  Counting immigrants from the rest of the EU would make no difference to the number who came. And, in any case, immigration raises GDP, rather than lowering it.
  • It is not possible to know whether greater use of a yellow card procedure – which is already in operation – would raise or lower GDP. More yellow cards might make services liberalisation more difficult, since national parliaments would have more power to thwart the European Commission’s efforts to open national markets. 
  • It is not apparent that the “pointless attacks” on the City of London have had a severe impact on London’s GDP. Rather, the main reason that UK banks’ regulatory costs have risen in recent years is due to domestic, not EU rules: the UK has been faster than other EU countries to raise capital, leverage and liquidity requirements.

A detailed and fair-minded appraisal of the macroeconomic consequences of these reforms might undermine the entire argument, and they are not available to the reader of Lyons’s report. The economic forecasts were provided by the Volterra consultancy, but the appendix does not tell the reader the method by which Volterra arrived at their figures. It simply says that “a reformed EU would, for example, offer free trade in services on the basis of passported regulation”, meaning a services market in which any supplier in the EU can provide services in another member-state without meeting its regulations. A free-trading Britain outside the EU “would encourage trade in services across the globe”. Their model, on the other hand, of an unreformed EU is one whose “prospects … are restricted on the supply side”. Then the report simply lists the GDP and employment numbers that Volterra has attached to these unspecific assumptions without explaining the model the consultancy used.

The report offers very little analysis of what might happen to the UK economy if it left the EU. Foreign direct investment (FDI), which the National Institute of Economic and Social Research has rightly pointed out is the constituent of GDP that is most at risk from an EU exit, receives one mention. Lyons acknowledges that Britain attracts more FDI than any other member-state, and cites a CityUK survey where 38 per cent of financial and professional services bosses said they would move some of their business outside London if Britain left. But Lyons dismisses their concerns, saying this “mirrors comments made by City leaders on the effect of the UK not joining the euro.” A fuller discussion is warranted. It is true that Britain’s decision to stay out of the euro did not prompt international banks to move operations out of the City. But Britain’s EU membership is one reason why: single market rules have allowed the City to be the eurozone’s wholesale banking centre. And higher trade barriers arising from an EU exit would be likely to reduce FDI in many sectors of the economy: market size is an important determinant of FDI flows, and Britain outside the EU would have less access to the single market, unless it pursued the ‘Norwegian option’ of joining the European Economic Area.

The discussion of the possible post-exit trade agreements is very brief: a page and a half. The Norwegian, Swiss and Turkish options are rightly dismissed as politically unworkable (all would require the UK to sign up to rules or trade agreements with little say over them). Lyons says that “the UK option” would be better. This would be a “comprehensive free trade agreement”. But it is hard to see how this option would lead to the kinds of growth rates he suggests. He thinks that the City would have less access to EU services markets than it has now. “It is unlikely [full access] will be granted”, and “it is not optimal” to lose full services market access, he says. And he does not believe that many EU rules would cease to operate in Britain – rules which he argues elsewhere in the report are severe constraints on British economic growth. While UK business “would decide to mirror EU regulations on products and services to allow ease of selling into the [EU] market”, he writes, these “would be business decisions, not something imposed by a centralised bureaucracy”. The report does say that Britain could repeal social and employment law. But it is hard to see how this would result in the growth that the report forecasts.

It is not ungenerous to say that the report’s headline figures were designed to lead to the conclusion that the current state of Conservative politics dictates: that staying in a reformed EU would be best; that leaving would be fine; and that the status quo is so bad that it is only marginally better than leaving the EU and erecting barriers to foreign competition. These are implausible claims that require some serious empirical backing to be convincing. The report does not even try.

John Springford is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

Friday, August 08, 2014

Dealing with Russia: Law, jaw and war

It has been a bad few days for Vladimir Putin. That makes it a particularly dangerous time for Ukraine and for the rest of Europe. The EU has imposed more sanctions on the Russian economy, Moscow has retaliated with an agricultural boycott and Russia appears ready to escalate the crisis: Russian troops are amassing on the Ukrainian border. The West needs to be clear about what it wants from Moscow and take international legal measures against Russia to pursue its objectives. It should also do more to help Ukraine defend its borders. But for the moment Western leaders should put aside the megaphone (particularly when the accompanying stick is disproportionately small) and pick up the telephone to the Kremlin.

The KGB reflexes of Putin and those around him will see a Western conspiracy in recent events. The reality is that two important court cases coincidentally finished within days of each other, both of which went against Russia; and the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on July 17th, which no one could have predicted, left the EU and US little choice but to impose tougher measures.

Since spring, the EU had been threatening so-called ‘tier three’ sanctions on whole sectors of the Russian economy, while changing its mind about what would trigger them. In the aftermath of the attack on the airliner and Russia’s inadequate response, the EU finally moved. On their own, the new sanctions on some financial transactions, defence trade, and transfer of energy-related technology are still at the lower end of what could be done. But they will put additional pressure on Russia's economy which is falling into recession. There are indications that – as the EU had hoped – fear of the impact of sanctions has started to cause splits in Putin’s circle, between the ex-KGB personnel and those with the largest financial interests.

Russia has retaliated with a boycott of Western agricultural imports, but it remains to be seen how effective these are at weakening Europe’s growing resolve. If Europe’s initial ‘tier three’ sanctions are not sufficient to change Putin’s mind, the EU should consider expanding their scope to include, for instance, the purchase of Russian oil. Moreover, European member-states should discourage France from delivering two ‘Mistral’ warships to Russia. Paris has said it will deliver the first, but may suspend delivery of the second ship, depending on Putin’s actions. To increase pressure on France, other EU member-states should set the right example, as did Germany when it decided on August 4th to cancel a defence deal with Russia. So far, EU sanctions have not been retroactive; existing defence deals or City contracts are not affected. EU leaders should re-consider this.

Potentially at least as important is the judgement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in favour of a group of former shareholders in the Russian oil company, Yukos. Yukos was once Russia’s largest private company until the Russian government drove it into bankruptcy and transferred its assets to state-owned Rosneft as part of Putin’s trial of strength with Yukos’s former owner, the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. On July 18th, the court issued a damning commentary on the Russian government’s business practices, and ordered it to pay more than $50 billion – about 2.5 per cent of Russia’s GDP – in compensation to the former shareholders. In an unrelated case, on July 31st, the European Court of Human Rights, which had already found in 2011 that Russia had violated Yukos’s right to a fair trial and protection of property, awarded another group of former Yukos shareholders €1.9 billion – the largest amount ever awarded in a human rights case.

The significance of the arbitration case is that if Russia refuses to pay up within 180 days (which is almost certain), the shareholders can ask foreign courts to seize Russian state-owned assets. This is because 150 countries (including Russia itself) are parties to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and therefore bound to enforce such judgements. Sovereign property, such as embassy buildings or naval vessels, is exempt from seizure, but property used for commercial purposes by state-owned companies is not. Given the extent to which the Russian government still owns or controls the economy, there will be plenty of targets; cases could go on for many years, and have a chilling effect on potential investors in Russia.

International legal mechanisms are the best weapons the EU has to deal with a state where the rule of law is weak; it should use them effectively. That will not be simple: member-states are sometimes slow or fickle when implementing EU sanctions legislation (inconsistent application of the anti-money laundering directives being a clear example). The Commission and other member-states need to do more to lean on countries that would rather profit from Russian misbehaviour than prevent it.

Where the Commission has power, it should be forceful in exercising it. This is particularly true in relation to trade and energy. Russia has begun to retaliate against EU sanctions by blocking exports of agricultural produce from European countries on spurious health grounds – a familiar tactic. The Commission should make full use of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism. This can be a slow process, but using it consistently whenever Russia violates its WTO obligations is the best way to put political and economic pressure on Russia to abide by the rules.

In the energy field, the Commission opened an anti-trust case against Gazprom in 2012. It sought to force the Russian gas company to divide its European pipeline business from its gas production business and let third-party gas suppliers have access to the pipeline; to allow the re-export of gas supplied by Gazprom; and to deal with unjustifiably high gas prices in countries (particularly in Central Europe) where Gazprom is a monopoly or near-monopoly supplier. The case should not be postponed until the next Commission takes office in the autumn. The Commission should also keep the pressure on the six member-states plus Serbia who are involved in the South Stream project (which would bring Russian gas to South Eastern Europe, bypassing Ukraine) to ensure that their contracts with Gazprom comply with EU competition law and regulations. In December 2013, the Commission found that all the contracts helped Gazprom to maintain its anti-competitive practices. If the Commission can force Gazprom to change its practices, it could have a major impact on both energy prices and energy security, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. So far, Bulgaria has suspended work on South Stream as a result of the Commission's action; but Austria and Hungary are pressing on.

Beyond looking for ways to bring Russia into line with international rules, the EU needs to step up its support for Ukraine. Ukraine’s armed forces have made significant progress in taking back territory in the east, but they still do not control the whole length of the border with Russia. There is plenty of evidence, including from careless social media posts by Russian soldiers, that Russian troops are on the Ukrainian side of the border and that Russian forces are shelling Ukrainian positions from inside Russia. Like the annexation of Crimea, these are grave breaches of international law, and the EU should give Ukraine political support if, as then-foreign minister Andriy Deshchytsia said in April, it takes Russia to the International Court of Justice. But the EU and the member-states should also consider what practical help they can give Ukraine to secure the border. The US has announced that it will supply engineering vehicles, transport and surveillance equipment for the border guards; the EU should take similar steps.

In June, EU foreign ministers agreed on the contours of a possible civilian mission to give Ukraine support on rule of law issues such as policing and the administration of justice. The EU should also discuss with the Ukrainian government whether military training would be beneficial. The performance of the Ukrainian army and national guard has improved considerably since Russian irregular forces first appeared on the Ukrainian mainland in March, but unless Russia stops arming, training and supporting rebel forces, the Ukrainians will find themselves at a disadvantage again. Ukraine is a sovereign state on Europe’s borders; the EU has every interest in ensuring that Kyiv can defend its territory.

At the same time, although the Ukrainian government has denied it, there is evidence that its forces have used artillery and the 'Grad' missile system, designed for use against concentrations of forces in open ground, against populated areas including the city of Donetsk. International human rights organisations have rightly been critical of this, but it is not clear that the Ukrainians have either the equipment or the training needed to clear rebel forces out of towns in any other way. The West should offer Ukraine alternatives to stop it from using inaccurate and indiscriminate weapons like 'Grad' in circumstances for which they were not designed. It would also remove a possible pretext for Putin to intervene in Ukraine on humanitarian grounds.

So far, Putin’s response to pressure (in the form of sanctions) and conciliation (such as the April 17th agreement brokered by the US and EU with Russia and Ukraine) has been to escalate. He is almost certainly more willing to accept the risk of full-scale conflict over Ukraine than any Western leader. But he is also more likely to miscalculate and cause a larger scale conflict in Europe if he is isolated – if Western leaders stop talking to him, and address him only through public statements.

There should be a moratorium on declarations of what Russia ‘must’ do. Instead, Western leaders should step up their personal contacts with Putin, however unproductive these may seem. An interesting piece of research by Jason Karaian of 'Quartz' shows that since February this year Putin has spoken to Angela Merkel more than 30 times; François Hollande 15 times, while Barack Obama and David Cameron have only spoken to him eight and seven times respectively. But now is the moment to pick up the phone and try to talk him out of taking any rash steps.

Without giving any ground on key international principles, or offering deals about Ukraine without Ukrainian approval, Western leaders should start to talk to Putin relentlessly, as often as he will take their calls, challenging his narrative. If he claims that Ukrainian forces are committing atrocities against Russian speakers, he should be asked to provide proof, or confronted with the contrary information from human rights monitors. If he denies that Russian forces are firing into Ukraine, he should be presented with the data to show the opposite. If the West knows that Russian armaments have crossed the border into Ukraine, the evidence should be laid out for him personally. Consistent efforts by European leaders to communicate with Putin are even more important now that the threat of a Russian military invasion in eastern Ukraine has increased.

Given the extent of the information war being waged by Russia's state-owned media, Western public broadcasters should also do whatever they can to provide for the Russian population an accurate, non-polemical account of what is happening in their neighbouring country.

It may be impossible to penetrate the information bubble around Putin – he may indeed have begun to believe the same propaganda that is shown on the Russian media. But if it is possible to set out an alternative version of what is happening, that might also give Putin the chance, if handled carefully, to use the traditional Russian myth of the good Tsar and the bad 'boyars' (nobles), and to blame his subordinates for freelancing.

Winston Churchill was certainly not afraid of a fight, but even he said that “jaw-jaw is better than war-war”. No one in the West wants to risk war with Russia. But in that case, the EU and the US need to put even more effort into influencing Putin’s decisions through international law and constant dialogue.

Ian Bond is director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform.

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

The EU and an independent Scotland

Scots living in Scotland vote on September 18th on whether to end their 300-year union with England. If they win, the nationalists aim for actual independence, and full EU membership, in March 2016. Opinion polls currently show a lead for the pro-Union side, but 15 or 20 per cent remain undecided. The debate is becoming heated, with arguments concentrating on the economic risks and opportunities of independence. The EU dimension has attracted less attention, with each side brusquely dismissing the other's assertions. Most Scots want to stay in the EU: the nationalists assert that this would be quick and easy; their opponents predict problems; impartial voices go largely unheard. Here are eight points which Scots might like to consider.

1. Beware those who say all is clear

 … it isn't. Anyone who says that it's certain the Scots could, or could not, have their own seat at the Council table from 2016 is driven more by advocacy than analysis. The fact is that the EU would be in uncharted waters. There is neither precedent nor treaty provision for a member-state splitting, with both parts wishing to stay in. Greenland chose to leave in 1985, with metropolitan Denmark negotiating its exit. The Czechs and Slovaks had split long before they joined in 2004. The EU is treaty-based: only independent states can negotiate and sign treaties. There would be concern in Brussels not to deprive EU citizens of EU rights because they live in Scotland; but the treaties are clear that EU citizenship is the corollary of citizenship of a member-state. And Scotland could not become a member-state until the relevant new treaty provisions came into force. Whether this circle can be squared is as yet uncertain. Don't believe anyone who says it definitely can or can't be.

2. Remember it isn't just up to the Scots

… or London, or even Brussels. All existing member-states would have to agree that Scotland could join, with their governments agreeing the terms, and their parliaments (or referendums) ratifying their decision. National governments have a natural aversion to secession: several EU countries that were ready to fight to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo can't yet bring themselves to recognise the fact of Kosovar independence from Belgrade. The oft-drawn parallel between Scottish and Catalan separatism is not exact: the Scots and English have always had different legal systems, and Scottish nationalists want to keep the Crown. Of course, the arguments for respecting the democratic will of the Scots would be strong; but so, in some EU capitals, might be the desire to demonstrate to domestic secessionists that the road to independent EU membership could be long and winding. Other countries could have other preoccupations; and nothing happens unless everyone signs up to everything.

3. Aim to settle the divorce terms first

… because the EU will adamantly refuse to mediate between London and Edinburgh. Getting involved in a domestic dispute between constituent parts of a member-state is off-limits for the Brussels institutions and would be anathema to other member-states. So full prior London/Edinburgh agreement on, for example, the division of UK assets and liabilities, and future currency and regulatory arrangements, would be a certain Brussels pre-condition for membership. Continuing disputes over an issue unrelated to EU membership could also cause knock-on delays if it meant that full UK government co-operation in Brussels was for a time withheld: the Trident nuclear submarines might be one such issue (the nationalists say they would insist on the Royal Navy vacating the Scottish bases that are essential for its strategic nuclear force). Unravelling the skein of the union would in any case take time, even with goodwill on both sides.

4. Negotiations should be easier

… with the EU than with London, provided Scottish negotiating aims are realistic. The Scots already respect all current EU laws, though discrimination against their English, Welsh and Northern Irish neighbours, for example on student fees, would become a breach of EU law when the two countries became separate member-states, and would have to cease. Those who argue that the Scots would be required to adopt the euro haven't noticed that Scotland would fail all the economic tests for candidates for eurozone membership: a declaration of intent to join at an appropriate unspecified future date would probably suffice. Equally implausible is the suggestion that the Scots would be obliged to join the Schengen area of passport-free travel, leaving the current UK/Ireland common travel area. Common sense would prevail, making it probably enough for Edinburgh to express a willingness to join Schengen whenever Dublin and London do. Voting weight in the Council is now determined automatically, by reference to population, and Scotland could expect to keep its six seats in the European Parliament (and might indeed be able to mount a case for an extra three, on grounds of parity with Denmark, whose population is also 5 million.) But on the price of membership, Scotland's net contribution to the EU budget, the nationalists would need to drop their current breezy claim that they would be due a rebate similar to that secured for the UK by Margaret Thatcher in 1984. Existing member-states, many much poorer in per capita terms than Scotland, would not agree to pay more to let the Scots pay less. Mrs Thatcher's success was the product of a long campaign, fought from inside: the chutzpah of simultaneously seeking to join the club and pay a reduced subscription would be an obvious deal-breaker. And, in EU legal terms, Scotland would be outside, knocking at the accession door, because Brussels is clear that…

5. Leaving the UK would mean leaving the EU

... in strict constitutional terms. This legal view has been spelt out by the president of the European Council and successive Commission presidents, now including president-designate Jean-Claude Juncker. The residual UK, minus Scotland, would be the ‘continuator’ state, and remain at the EU table. Scotland, as a new state, would need to ask, from outside, for a new seat: the relevant accession procedures are laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. Nationalists in Scotland disagree, and claim that separate membership could be achieved seamlessly from within, using Article 48, which sets out how existing member-states can seek to change the treaties. It is not clear, however, how they envisage overturning established Brussels doctrine, and there are strong legal arguments against using a general article (48) for an issue (admitting a new member) that is covered by specific provisions (Article 49). The key point is that the Scots cannot make up the rules. They may claim that the referee is wrong, but it is he who runs the game. It follows that ...

6. Minimising disruption matters most

A more constructive aim for Edinburgh would be to focus on seeking transitional arrangements to maintain the EU status of Scottish citizens during the hiatus between secession from the UK and full membership of the EU. Even in the highly unlikely event that the Scots managed to persuade the referee to reverse his ruling, and turn to Article 48, facilitating pre-independence negotiations, such a gap looks unavoidable, for two reasons.
(i) Recognition. Only sovereign states can sign treaties. Scotland would not be sovereign until independent. And before the Scots could sign an EU accession treaty, all existing EU member-states would have to recognise that independence.
(ii) Ratification. EU treaties do not enter into force until ratified by all signatory states. This takes time: in Belgium, for example, seven separate legislatures have to approve. And the EU is a convoy, moving at the speed of the slowest ship.
Countries whose accession treaties have been agreed but not yet universally ratified are usually allowed an observer's seat in Council of Ministers, though the right to vote and to nominate a commissioner has to await full membership. What would be novel (though not necessarily unachievable, given that the situation itself is unprecedented) would be an agreement that, de facto while not yet de jure, Scottish enterprises, farmers, fishermen, workers and students should retain their EU rights. This is what matters most, because ...

7. It would all take longer than you think

Settling the intra-UK divorce terms, a pre-condition for any EU negotiation, won't be easy. Even when campaign tempers cool, actual secession by 2016 looks unrealistic. The 2015 UK election will supervene, and may be followed by the distraction of a UK EU renegotiation and 2017 referendum, occupying Brussels' attention, and perhaps tempting other member-states to adopt a policy of wait and see. Scotland's position in the EU would clearly be very different if the residual UK were to leave. Negotiation (or informal pre-negotiation) before independence could be obstructed by other member-states (point 2 above); or held up by intransigence in London or Edinburgh (point 3): by over-bidding by Edinburgh (point 4); or by constitutional quarrels over the rules (point 5). And even if substantive terms, and sensible transitional arrangements, had been informally agreed before Scottish secession, the twin hurdles of recognition and ratification (point 6) would still lie ahead. So don't hold your breath.

8. Anglo-Scottish teamwork would be critical

To maximise the chances of escaping from the constitutional catch-22 that Brussels institutions may negotiate only with states, pre-independence discussions with Brussels would have to be led, at least notionally, by the London government. Nationalists in Edinburgh now recoil at the idea; and so might bad losers in London if the nationalists win on September 18th. Yet co-operation would be essential to success in Brussels, and UK embassies across the EU would need to work to an agreed UK/Scottish brief. And, apart from considerations of duty and equity, it would be in London's self-interest to help the Scots: if no transitional arrangements for Scotland were in place when the UK broke up, the task of manning the EU customs union's new frontier on the England/Scotland Border would fall to those south of Hadrian's Wall.

9. Remember point 1: No-one really knows

… for sure what a Yes on 18th September would mean for Scotland and the EU. I certainly don't, though I know the EU quite well. Sir David Edward, a Scotsman who served with distinction as a judge in the European Court of Justice, is right to ask Scots to question – in an article earlier this month – the purpose of "launching ourselves on this sea of uncertainty."

Full disclosure. I admit that, as a diaspora Scot disenfranchised by David Cameron's casual concessions to Alex Salmond, I hate the idea of my countrymen being obliged to choose between being Scottish and being British. I think the dichotomy as false as that between being British and European. Wider horizons create greater opportunities; and just as EU membership has greatly benefitted the British, so the 1707 Union has hugely benefitted the Scots. Long may both last.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard is a former permanent under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is chairman of the Centre for European Reform.

Wednesday, July 09, 2014

Will the eurozone gang up on Britain?

Both British eurosceptics and Britain’s continental critics believe some or all of the following: that the eurozone will have to integrate further; that the priorities of the eurozone will predominate over those of the euro ‘outs’; and that David Cameron will win nothing but minor reforms in any negotation.

In this view, the “remorseless logic” of eurozone integration will marginalise Britain to such an extent that it will be forced to leave the EU, since it will not join the euro. This argument has some merits – there is little reason to believe that the British have enough political capital to lead a push for major EU reform, for example. But the economic interests of the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ are aligned to a greater degree than they are opposed. If these interests are managed with care, there is no reason why Britain should leave the EU.

The eurozone needs to integrate in two ways to become more stable. It needs a more integrated market for capital and labour, so that workers and capital can move easily to the places where they can be most productively employed. This would help it to respond to shocks more rapidly, and requires a deeper single market – one of Britain’s reform priorities. The eurozone also needs a way to share risk – a common budget, a common backstop for the banking sector, and further debt mutualisation – to help stabilise demand in countries in recession. There is little appetite in the eurozone for such a system at present, but the next downturn may force it to reconsider. Greater integration would make its economy less fragile – and would in turn help Britain. The eurozone is Britain’s largest trading partner, and its crisis has badly hit British exports, putting paid to hopes of an export-led recovery.

British fears that a eurozone ‘caucus’ will materialise, particularly on single market regulation, are overblown. The Germans, Finnish and Dutch have little interest in, say, extending ‘social Europe’ – and align themselves more with the British on social and employment rules. Western Europeans in general are as concerned about immigration from Central and Eastern Europe as the British, even if the tone of their newspapers and mainstream politicians is less hostile. Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi has made a deeper single market for services one of his priorities.

On extending the single market and free trade agreements, it is an exaggeration to say that eurozone member-states constitute a protectionist bloc, and are opposed to market liberalisation. To understand why, consider the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) product market regulation indicators, which show how keen different EU member-states are to regulate their economies. Between 1998 and 2013, the eurozone and other EU member-states converged on the UK, as their levels of product market regulation were reduced more quickly than Britain’s (see Chart 1). Their overall level of product market regulation is now only marginally above that of the UK (the index ranks countries’ level of regulation between 0 and 6).

Chart 1. OECD index of product market regulation

Chart 2 shows the OECD’s measure of the willingness of countries to open their markets to foreign competition. It shows the same pattern of convergence as the overall index, and offers little evidence that the eurozone will club together to block free trade deals or the European Commission’s initiatives to extend the single market.

Chart 2. OECD barriers to trade and investment index

If the eurozone ‘caucus’ is going to be a problem, it will be in decisions on financial regulation. The City of London’s position as the EU’s dominant wholesale financial centre – and one that is outside the eurozone – would seem to suggest a major clash of interests. Many Britons fear that the the rest of the eurozone will gang up on the City in an attempt to shift activity to Frankfurt and Paris. However, the situation is more complex than City of London banks, the British media and eurosceptic think tanks suggest.

The UK has already won a double majority voting system on the European Banking Authority – the agency that writes EU ‘prudential’ financial rules, which seek to prevent the financial system from blowing up. Under the system, both eurozone and non-eurozone members must find a majority in favour of a financial rule. Eventually, if other member-states join the single currency, this system will have to be revisited, as it would end up giving Britain disproportionate power over regulation. But this is likely to be a long time coming: Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria do not look likely to join the single currency any time soon. Denmark has a opt-out from the euro, like the UK.

Moreover, British and eurozone member-states do not have serious differences over prudential regulation. The UK has gone further than most other EU member-states to force their banks to raise capital and liquidity, to reduce leverage, and to try to ringfence retail and investment banking. Before the crisis, the UK was rightly accused of running a light-touch regime. This charge no longer holds: now the problem lies in the difficulty of creating a eurozone banking union that is capable of preventing banking crises and limiting their effects when they do occur.

There are areas where the UK is losing its battles, but it is far from clear that a eurozone ‘caucus’ is to blame. The financial transactions tax is likely to be a lower tax on a smaller number of financial instruments than the original proposal, because the member-states that have signed up to it – several eurozone members have not – cannot agree on how much activity it should catch in its net. It may end up covering only shares and some derivatives. If so, the financial transactions tax would be similar to the UK’s stamp duty on shares, which also has extraterritorial reach: an investor from another EU member-state that sells a share in a British company must pay UK stamp duty. And the European Court of Justice has yet to rule on the final proposal. It may find that the extraterritorial scope of the tax means that it is illegal under the EU treaties (as the European Council's legal service has found).

But is not the European Central Bank’s (ECB) ‘location policy’ a sign of increasing regulatory protectionism on the part of the eurozone? Last week, the European Court of Justice started hearing evidence on the British government’s case against the policy, and if it rules in favour of the ECJ, City clearing houses specialising in euro-denominated trading will relocate across the Channel. The British media has turned the case into a test of the EU institutions’ willingness to balance British interests against those of the eurozone. The ECB’s rationale for the policy is not without justification: it argues that it should supervise clearing houses, since they will need emergency central bank lending in euros – ‘liquidity’ – if they get into trouble. Clearing houses are increasingly important bearers of risk, because complex derivatives – financial contracts that were at the centre of the 2008 crash – are being standardised and investors forced to trade them on exchanges. Regulators hope that this will make the risks in the financial system more transparent. If a clearing house gets into trouble, derivatives markets will freeze, unless the central bank keeps it going with liquidity. And in trades denominated in euros, most participants are large eurozone-based banks: the ECB has a legitimate interest in the supervision of this activity. The British should not blame eurozone protectionism for the ECJ’s ruling, if it concurs with the ECB.

There are a few other areas where it is possible to envisage conflict in coming years. The resolution of a eurozone headquartered bank with large operations in the City of London is one. The eurozone and the UK government may have opposing interests when it comes to resolution: eurozone authorities will seek control of the bank’s assets, even if a part of its balance sheet is under the Bank of England’s jurisdiction. There are unresolved questions about how banks that get into trouble in London will access ECB liquidity.

But the City of London’s position as the EU’s largest wholesale centre does not appear to be severely imperilled by the eurozone. And even where conflicts do arise, as a member of the EU, it can form alliances with other member-states to make changes to proposals and defend its single market rights at the ECJ. Rather, the potential for serious conflict lies more in the EU’s institutions and priorities than its rules. The solution lies in diplomacy.

The British government will have to get used to the fact that the top jobs in the next European Commission will mostly go to eurozone member-states, as the UK is the only rich and large EU country that is not in the euro. There is some sympathy in Northern Europe for the UK’s position. But the British are squandering this sympathy, by pursuing a strategy of threats, vetoes, and red lines. The source of the trouble is the Conservative demand for a renegotiated settlement as the price of the UK’s continued membership of the EU. This strategy was intended to appease English euroscepticism while securing policy changes at the EU level, but it has stoked anti-British sentiment to the degree that other member-states fear making common cause with the UK. And the strategy makes it harder to create the conditions for compromise between the interests of the eurozone, the UK government and the City of London that is needed to make Britain’s position – in the EU, but not in the eurozone – legitimate on both sides of the Channel.

The route to a new EU settlement will be slow and tortuous. The eurozone will probably have to integrate further to flourish, and, over time, some member-states who have committed to joining will do so. But there are few reasons why a political settlement between members of the single market and of the eurozone cannot be reached, if politicians will only try.

John Springford is senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.

Tuesday, July 08, 2014

The eurozone’s real interest rate problem

When the UK was considering euro membership, former chancellor Gordon Brown suggested five criteria that needed to be met. The first, and arguably most important, concerned interest rates. Specifically, he said economies of the eurozone needed to be sufficiently compatible to live with common eurozone interest rates on a permanent basis. The recent crisis suggests they were not. The main underlying reason is that real interest rates, that is, the interest rates after adjusting for inflation, can diverge quite drastically in a monetary union – and unfortunately in the wrong direction, thereby amplifying boom and bust cycles. This is especially true in a diverse and decentralised monetary union like the eurozone. Fiscal and regulatory policies need to work aggressively against this phenomenon, to ensure countries grow steadily without protracted booms or slumps. Before the crisis, the eurozone clearly failed on this account. Today it continues to do too little to avoid such harmful divergence, which points to a period of low and uneven growth in the eurozone.

In the eurozone, market forces and the benchmark rates set by the European Central Bank (ECB) collaborate to make nominal interest rates converge in normal times. If there were differences, markets would make use of it and ‘arbitrage’ the difference away. As a result, nominal interest rates for government bonds or corporate loans across the eurozone are usually similar. However, it is real interest rates which ultimately matter for investment and consumption decisions because they represent the real cost of borrowing. If nominal interest rates are 2 per cent but inflation is also 2 per cent, the cost of borrowing is zero because everything will have become more expensive over the year. Since inflation rates differ across countries that are at different points of the business cycle, real interest rates can and usually are very different across countries in a monetary union.

Unfortunately, this divergence tends to amplify the cycle. When an economy is booming, inflation is usually high; whereas when an economy is stagnating or in recession, inflation tends to be low. Real interest rates will thus be low in booming countries with high inflation. This gives the boom a further push, as lower real interest rates encourage consumption and investment. In stagnating economies, where inflation is low, real interest rates will be high, further weakening the recovery.

Chart one: The difference between real interest rates for German and Spanish governments

Source: Haver Analytics, CER calculation; the calculation is simplified: 10 year government bonds minus current CPI (instead of inflation expectations).

Spain in the early 2000s is a case in point: the more the economy boomed and the more inflation rose, the lower real interest rates became (see charts). This stimulated the economy further, as low interest rates made investment (for instance in real estate) more worthwhile. Since there was no national Spanish interest rate but a eurozone one, such self-reinforcing dynamics played out almost uncontested – until the crash. In Germany, with low inflation and growth in the first half of the 2000s, the opposite was the case: low inflation led to high real interest rates. Thus, the economy was further weakened at a time when it needed stimulus, prolonging the period of subpar growth. Now the pattern is reversed, Spain has experienced a depression and struggles to recover while Germany is growing. Real interest rates show the same upside-down pattern: Spain’s real interest rates are significantly above Germany’s, crippling a recovery in Spain while low real rates in Germany potentially stimulate its already robust economy further.

Chart two: Real interest rates for firms in Europe

Source: Haver Analytics, CER calculation; the calculation is simplified: 1-5 year interest rates on firm loans minus current CPI (instead of inflation expectations) for the past, and IMF inflation expectations for 2014-2019.

Divergent real interest rates are a natural phenomenon in a monetary union. The policy response to them is not: fiscal and regulatory policies need to be used aggressively in order to counteract the negative effects of this upside-down divergence – especially in a decentralised monetary union like the eurozone where there are no automated fiscal transfers. In a boom, fiscal policy needs to be very restrictive – Spain’s surpluses before the crisis were not large enough. Financial regulation should make lending more expensive in booming countries, thus effectively increasing interest rates for businesses and consumers there. At the same time, eurozone member-states that are in recession or only growing slowly need to be able to use fiscal stimulus to counteract the negative effects of higher real interest rates. Financial regulation should facilitate lending in these countries.

Unfortunately, the eurozone is not drawing the right conclusions. Most countries are consolidating their budgets during a period of low growth and inflation, instead of counteracting the drag from high real interest rates. For the future of eurozone growth, that means too high real interest rates will continue to weigh on countries like Spain, Italy and even France. The verdict on German fiscal policy is still out, given that Germany has yet to boom.

Likewise, regulatory policies are not being used to lower interest rates in countries in recession or stagnation, and to tighten standards in the booming parts. The reason is not a policy failure by regulators – they stand ready to counteract booms, certainly more so than in the past. The failure lies with the ECB and the overall fiscal policy in the eurozone. Both have prevented the eurozone from growing at a sufficient level by being too cautious (ECB) or outright restrictive (fiscal policy). Ideally, the overall fiscal and monetary policy stance should raise average growth and inflation to an appropriate level. Regulatory policies could then curtail a lending spree in the booming parts that enjoy too low real interest rates while facilitating lower real interest rates in sluggish economies.

Finally, the financial sector is adding to the divergence in real interest rates: banks and, more importantly, firms have to pay a premium on borrowed money for the simple fact of being in, say, Italy. This is because financial risk after the crisis is still attached to the government of the state where the bank or firm is located. The European banking union was supposed to bring an end to this ‘country risk’ but it has so far only partially succeeded: in the event of a major crisis, German banks will still be perceived as safer, reducing their borrowing costs now, and vice versa for Italian or Spanish banks. Thus, some country risk will remain for the coming years. As the cruel logic of a crisis mandates, this country risk adds to the real interest rates in the worst-affected countries, worsening the macroeconomic dynamic outlined above.

For the growth prospects of the eurozone, in particular those countries currently growing slowly, this has important implications. While diverging real interest rates are a common feature of a decentralised monetary union, fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy play an important part in counteracting their upside-down dynamic. But as long as eurozone fiscal and monetary policy does not change to support growth, and inflation remains very low as a result, real interest rates in the South will remain high – too high for a meaningful recovery. The recent news on a stalling recovery should come as no surprise.

Christian Odendahl is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.