by Katinka Barysch
Countries that want to join the EU need to show that their democracies work well. However, press freedom – a key ingredient of any pluralist democracy – is under threat in most of the countries that are now queuing for accession. Independent newspapers and broadcasters are being squeezed out of the market. Critical journalists are being sacked, beaten or locked up. Without curious and courageous journalists, crime and cronyism flourish, public debate is stunted and politicians feel unaccountable. The EU could do more to protect media freedom in the Western Balkans and Turkey.
The erosion of press freedom has been most striking in Turkey recently. A shocking 50-60 journalists are now in jail (depending on who does the counting), mostly accused of plotting to overthrow the government or split the country. Some 10,000 lawsuits are pending against writers and broadcasters. Many journalists suspect that their phones are tapped and their e-mails read. Fear and suspicion pervade the media. In the press freedom ranking of Reporters without Borders, a Paris-based NGO, Turkey has dropped to 138th place, behind Iraq and only just ahead of Russia.
The situation in the Western Balkan countries is similarly worrying. Scores of journalists have been beaten up or intimidated. A couple have lost their lives, with their killers usually going unpunished. Some of Serbia's and Croatia's best-known journalists now live with constant police protection. Many of their colleagues prefer self-censorship to a life in fear or unemployment.
The problems that the region's newspapers, radio stations and TV broadcasters grapple with are complex. Direct state censorship is arguably the least of their problems. Pressure is indirect and comes from various sides. Money is a huge constraint, especially in the small, fragmented Balkan media markets. The economic crisis that started in 2008 has led to painful losses of advertising revenue. Media companies have sacked staff and dumbed down their coverage. Investigative journalism is becoming a luxury.
Some media bosses would not want their journalists to snoop around too much anyway. Conflicts of interests are rife: although ownership structures are often obscure, it is clear that many newspapers and TV stations form part of bigger business empires. Owners fear that they will lose lucrative public contracts or other favours from politicians if their journalists write about government corruption or crime. Others are using their media outlets blatantly to promote their own interests. Albania, with fewer inhabitants than Berlin, has 25 daily newspapers. Most of them are controlled by local mini-tycoons wrestling for influence. In such an environment, journalists are little more than PR writers.
West Europeans can usually rely on well-funded public service broadcasters for information. But trying to build a local version of the BBC is not the solution for South East Europe. In most Balkan countries, public TV stations function more like "ministries for propaganda", says Remzi Lani of the Albanian Media Institute. Their coverage is neither independent nor balanced. In the Western Balkans, a legacy of ethnic hatred and fervent nationalism makes for a toxic media landscape. In Turkey, the press mirrors the political schism between the mildly Islamist AK government and its Kemalist opponents.
"Governments need to stop seeing the media as their private property", warns Dunja Mijatovic, the OSCE’s Media Freedom Representative. Some observers hope that internet bloggers and other forms of 'citizen journalism' could fill the gap between self-serving commercial media and politicised public ones. However, most web publications do not generate income to pay for investigative journalism. And governments are clamping down on the internet as well. The Turkish government has blocked an estimated 12,000 websites to date. It is now planning to make 'filters' compulsory to prevent Turks from viewing websites that contain pornography. Access to sites containing one or more of 138 'prohibited' words (including puzzling items such as skirt, homemade and Haydar) would be blocked automatically.
The European Commission, in charge of monitoring accession countries' compliance with civil liberties and democratic standards, is getting seriously worried. It has repeatedly flagged up the deteriorating media environment in its annual assessments of accession preparations. Yet the situation keeps getting worse. To help it figure out what to do, the Commission gathered over 450 journalists and activists from the Western Balkans and Turkey in Brussels on May 6th. Many of them were seething with frustration: "The Europeans are hypocrites. They say they worry about journalism in our countries. But they still support our governments", said one editor.
The EU has been shy to put pressure on accession country governments. First, the EU's own record on media freedom is not flawless, with Hungary's new restrictive media law and Silvio Berlusconi's grip on Italy’s television the most frequently cited examples. Second, the EU has only a limited role in the media sector. There is, for example, a directive telling member-states not to discriminate against media outlets from other EU countries. But on the whole, the acquis in this area is thin and rules are made by national governments or by self-regulatory bodies.
To its credit, the Commission is becoming more outspoken, in particular in response to the most recent arrests of journalists in Turkey. Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule is also thinking about singling out press freedom as a more explicit benchmark for accession. At the moment, it is just one of the many items assessed under the criterion of a 'functioning democracy' (the other accession criteria concern market economics and the implementation of EU law).
The Commission could also do more to monitor the broader environment in which journalists in Turkey and the Western Balkans operate. While the accession countries usually have nice-sounding laws on media freedom, these are often not implemented properly. Other laws, covering defamation, anti-terrorism, taxation or public procurement, have been used to prosecute journalists and bankrupt or disadvantage their employers. The Commission has a remit to push accession countries to reform their judiciaries and improve the wider business environment for media outlets. It should use it forcefully.
In addition, the Commission should ask accession countries to make media ownership more transparent and clamp down on conflicts of interest. It should work out benchmarks against which the region's fledgling self-regulatory bodies can be measured. It could join other donors in funding training for investigative journalists or support for independent news websites.
Most importantly, the EU and its member-states have to become more vocal about their concerns. Past attempts to put pressure on the governments of Turkey and some Balkan countries through silent diplomacy have not worked. "Our politicians are liars", says Saso Ordanoski, an editor from Macedonia. "They will promise anything unless they are exposed to public scrutiny."
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform.
Monday, May 16, 2011
Monday, May 09, 2011
Debt restructuring will not end the euro crisis
by Simon Tilford
Even as the ink is still drying on Portugal’s EU/IMF ‘bail-out’ agreement, it is becoming clear that Greece’s 2010 bail-out has failed to improve the sustainability of its public finances. There are even rumours (strenuously denied) that the German government has drawn up plans for a Greek withdrawal from the currency union. Far from improving access to the financial markets, the support packages for Greece and Ireland (which succumbed to a bail-out of its own in December 2010) have left these countries facing record borrowing costs. The reasons for this are by now well-rehearsed. The markets do not believe that the struggling euro countries are going to grow rapidly enough to service their debts. By increasing their debts further, the bail-outs have made investors even more sceptical. The outlook for Portugal is similar, notwithstanding the slightly less draconian terms of its agreement.
All three countries will eventually have to restructure their debts. Initially, the EU will no doubt try and get away with ‘soft’ restructurings, involving a combination of longer maturities and lower interest rates. But this will not work and by 2013 there will be no viable alternative to ‘hard’ restructurings (default) comprising debt write-downs of 50 per cent or more. Unfortunately, in the case of Greece and Portugal at least, even this will not guarantee continued membership of the euro.
Debt restructuring of this scale will be messy and fraught with risks. The eurozone will have to inject capital into the banks of peripheral countries, which have huge holdings of their respective governments’ debts. Banks based elsewhere in the eurozone that have large exposures to peripheral country debt will have to raise capital from private investors or from their governments. However, by the time the EU gets around to a ‘hard’ debt restructuring in 2013, public bodies (EU governments, the ECB and the IMF) will have assumed at least half of the private sector’s exposure to the public debt of the defaulting countries. In order to prevent debt restructuring from causing a flight from government debt markets across the rest of the eurozone, the ECB will have to stand ready to provide liquidity and, if necessary, purchase government bonds. The ECB itself will have to book huge losses on the money it lent to banks in the defaulting countries. But assuming all this can be achieved without a systemic financial crisis, what then? Will such a debt restructuring/default solve the crisis?
Cutting the debt burdens of the peripheral states will only go so far to resolving their problems. After all, interest payments on their outstanding public debt account for a relatively small (albeit quickly rising) proportion of their budget deficits. Reducing the cost of servicing the outstanding stock of public debt by 50-60 per cent would obviously improve the long-term sustainability of these countries' fiscal positions. But unless the defaulting countries can engineer a return to economic growth, they will continue to struggle to tap the capital markets on anything but prohibitively expensive terms. Of the three peripheral economies, only Ireland stands a good chance of convincing investors of its solvency.
Assuming Ireland’s public debt is written down by around 50 per cent in 2013 (when its debt-to-GDP ratio will have climbed to around 120 per cent of GDP) its debt ratio would be a manageable looking 60 per cent. However, in all likelihood it will also still have a huge budget deficit, which will require on-going budget austerity. In Ireland’s case investors will probably calculate that the Irish economy will be strong enough to weather continued austerity. Ireland is now running a current-account surplus – so it is not dependent on foreign borrowing to finance the deficit and the foreign balance is not a drag on its economy. There will be no return to Celtic Tiger rates of expansion, but the country’s export sector is competitive. Exports should perform relatively strongly, holding out the promise of decent economic growth. As a result, Ireland could regain access to financial markets relatively quickly following a ‘hard’ debt restructuring.
What about Greece and Portugal? In both cases the picture is bleaker. Assuming that the ratio of Greek debt rises to over 160 per cent of GDP before the EU finally pushes ahead with a ‘hard’ restructuring involving a write-down of as much as 60 per cent, the country would have a debt to GDP ratio of 65 per cent. However, investors will be sceptical of the Greek economy’s ability to absorb the cuts needed to bring down the still very large budget deficit. The Greek government will be largely dependent on foreign borrowing to finance the budget deficit: Greece’s current-account deficit has narrowed, but remains very large. Unlike Ireland, Greece will find it very hard to generate the stimulus from exports needed to offset the impact of continued austerity. Exports only account for around 25 per cent of Greek GDP – compared with well over 100 per cent in the Irish case – and Greece does little trade with countries outside the slow-growing EU. Investors will surely bet that they will not get bailed out by taxpayers a second time, and continue to deny Greece market access.
What about Portugal? Portugal has a lower stock of public debt than Greece – at around 95 per cent of GDP – but it has a very sizeable budget deficit, hugely indebted private sector and current account deficit of a comparable size to Greece’s. The combined debt of Portugal’s public and private sectors (excluding debts between banks) is now around 300 per cent of GDP. A chunk of this private sector debt will end up on the government’s books. Under its agreement with the EU and IMF, Portugal has to underwrite €35bn of its banks’ liabilities – equivalent to around 20 per cent of its GDP. But with the Portuguese economy set to contract steeply over the next two years (the EU forecasts falls in GDP of 2 per cent in both 2011 and 2012) the eventual transfer of debt from the private to the public sector is likely to be substantially higher than $35 billion.
If, as seems likely, the ratio of Portugal’s public debt to GDP rises to close to 120 per cent by 2013, a 50 per cent write-down would reduce the debt to around 60 per cent of GDP. But with the fiscal deficit large and export-led growth elusive, investors will remain wary of lending to the Portuguese government. Portugal’s economy is more open than Greece’s, but nowhere near as open as Ireland’s, and does similarly little trade with non-EU markets. Moreover, the country’s principal export market – Spain – faces years of economic stagnation as it grapples with problems not dissimilar to those of Portugal. Portuguese businesses have also experienced a huge loss of trade competitiveness within the eurozone. Added to this, the euro is likely to remain very strong against the dollar as the US Federal Reserve maintains a loose monetary policy and the ECB raises interest rates.
What will then happen? Further bail-outs of Greece and Portugal in the form of loans from the rest of the eurozone are unlikely. Everyone will by then recognise that piling more debt on top of already unsustainable levels makes little sense. This will leave two alternatives: fiscal transfers (the dreaded ‘fiscal union’) or a withdrawal of the affected countries from the currency union. Faced with the possibility of countries leaving the currency union, it is impossible to discount the possibility of a shift to some kind of transfer union. But the politics look formidably difficult. Could there be a negotiated withdrawal from the currency union? It would require action on a number of fronts, including emergency support for the affected countries’ banks and the imposition of temporary capital controls. The quitting countries’ debts would have to be redenominated into their newly introduced (and massively devalued) currencies. The rules stating that any country leaving the currency union would have to quit the EU would also have to be fudged. It is impossible to attach a likelihood to all this happening. But given the obstacles to fiscal transfers between eurozone economies it would be unwise to bet too much money against it.
Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.
Even as the ink is still drying on Portugal’s EU/IMF ‘bail-out’ agreement, it is becoming clear that Greece’s 2010 bail-out has failed to improve the sustainability of its public finances. There are even rumours (strenuously denied) that the German government has drawn up plans for a Greek withdrawal from the currency union. Far from improving access to the financial markets, the support packages for Greece and Ireland (which succumbed to a bail-out of its own in December 2010) have left these countries facing record borrowing costs. The reasons for this are by now well-rehearsed. The markets do not believe that the struggling euro countries are going to grow rapidly enough to service their debts. By increasing their debts further, the bail-outs have made investors even more sceptical. The outlook for Portugal is similar, notwithstanding the slightly less draconian terms of its agreement.
All three countries will eventually have to restructure their debts. Initially, the EU will no doubt try and get away with ‘soft’ restructurings, involving a combination of longer maturities and lower interest rates. But this will not work and by 2013 there will be no viable alternative to ‘hard’ restructurings (default) comprising debt write-downs of 50 per cent or more. Unfortunately, in the case of Greece and Portugal at least, even this will not guarantee continued membership of the euro.
Debt restructuring of this scale will be messy and fraught with risks. The eurozone will have to inject capital into the banks of peripheral countries, which have huge holdings of their respective governments’ debts. Banks based elsewhere in the eurozone that have large exposures to peripheral country debt will have to raise capital from private investors or from their governments. However, by the time the EU gets around to a ‘hard’ debt restructuring in 2013, public bodies (EU governments, the ECB and the IMF) will have assumed at least half of the private sector’s exposure to the public debt of the defaulting countries. In order to prevent debt restructuring from causing a flight from government debt markets across the rest of the eurozone, the ECB will have to stand ready to provide liquidity and, if necessary, purchase government bonds. The ECB itself will have to book huge losses on the money it lent to banks in the defaulting countries. But assuming all this can be achieved without a systemic financial crisis, what then? Will such a debt restructuring/default solve the crisis?
Cutting the debt burdens of the peripheral states will only go so far to resolving their problems. After all, interest payments on their outstanding public debt account for a relatively small (albeit quickly rising) proportion of their budget deficits. Reducing the cost of servicing the outstanding stock of public debt by 50-60 per cent would obviously improve the long-term sustainability of these countries' fiscal positions. But unless the defaulting countries can engineer a return to economic growth, they will continue to struggle to tap the capital markets on anything but prohibitively expensive terms. Of the three peripheral economies, only Ireland stands a good chance of convincing investors of its solvency.
Assuming Ireland’s public debt is written down by around 50 per cent in 2013 (when its debt-to-GDP ratio will have climbed to around 120 per cent of GDP) its debt ratio would be a manageable looking 60 per cent. However, in all likelihood it will also still have a huge budget deficit, which will require on-going budget austerity. In Ireland’s case investors will probably calculate that the Irish economy will be strong enough to weather continued austerity. Ireland is now running a current-account surplus – so it is not dependent on foreign borrowing to finance the deficit and the foreign balance is not a drag on its economy. There will be no return to Celtic Tiger rates of expansion, but the country’s export sector is competitive. Exports should perform relatively strongly, holding out the promise of decent economic growth. As a result, Ireland could regain access to financial markets relatively quickly following a ‘hard’ debt restructuring.
What about Greece and Portugal? In both cases the picture is bleaker. Assuming that the ratio of Greek debt rises to over 160 per cent of GDP before the EU finally pushes ahead with a ‘hard’ restructuring involving a write-down of as much as 60 per cent, the country would have a debt to GDP ratio of 65 per cent. However, investors will be sceptical of the Greek economy’s ability to absorb the cuts needed to bring down the still very large budget deficit. The Greek government will be largely dependent on foreign borrowing to finance the budget deficit: Greece’s current-account deficit has narrowed, but remains very large. Unlike Ireland, Greece will find it very hard to generate the stimulus from exports needed to offset the impact of continued austerity. Exports only account for around 25 per cent of Greek GDP – compared with well over 100 per cent in the Irish case – and Greece does little trade with countries outside the slow-growing EU. Investors will surely bet that they will not get bailed out by taxpayers a second time, and continue to deny Greece market access.
What about Portugal? Portugal has a lower stock of public debt than Greece – at around 95 per cent of GDP – but it has a very sizeable budget deficit, hugely indebted private sector and current account deficit of a comparable size to Greece’s. The combined debt of Portugal’s public and private sectors (excluding debts between banks) is now around 300 per cent of GDP. A chunk of this private sector debt will end up on the government’s books. Under its agreement with the EU and IMF, Portugal has to underwrite €35bn of its banks’ liabilities – equivalent to around 20 per cent of its GDP. But with the Portuguese economy set to contract steeply over the next two years (the EU forecasts falls in GDP of 2 per cent in both 2011 and 2012) the eventual transfer of debt from the private to the public sector is likely to be substantially higher than $35 billion.
If, as seems likely, the ratio of Portugal’s public debt to GDP rises to close to 120 per cent by 2013, a 50 per cent write-down would reduce the debt to around 60 per cent of GDP. But with the fiscal deficit large and export-led growth elusive, investors will remain wary of lending to the Portuguese government. Portugal’s economy is more open than Greece’s, but nowhere near as open as Ireland’s, and does similarly little trade with non-EU markets. Moreover, the country’s principal export market – Spain – faces years of economic stagnation as it grapples with problems not dissimilar to those of Portugal. Portuguese businesses have also experienced a huge loss of trade competitiveness within the eurozone. Added to this, the euro is likely to remain very strong against the dollar as the US Federal Reserve maintains a loose monetary policy and the ECB raises interest rates.
What will then happen? Further bail-outs of Greece and Portugal in the form of loans from the rest of the eurozone are unlikely. Everyone will by then recognise that piling more debt on top of already unsustainable levels makes little sense. This will leave two alternatives: fiscal transfers (the dreaded ‘fiscal union’) or a withdrawal of the affected countries from the currency union. Faced with the possibility of countries leaving the currency union, it is impossible to discount the possibility of a shift to some kind of transfer union. But the politics look formidably difficult. Could there be a negotiated withdrawal from the currency union? It would require action on a number of fronts, including emergency support for the affected countries’ banks and the imposition of temporary capital controls. The quitting countries’ debts would have to be redenominated into their newly introduced (and massively devalued) currencies. The rules stating that any country leaving the currency union would have to quit the EU would also have to be fudged. It is impossible to attach a likelihood to all this happening. But given the obstacles to fiscal transfers between eurozone economies it would be unwise to bet too much money against it.
Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Can the Arab spring bring peace to the Middle East?
by Clara Marina O'Donnell
Many western diplomats and observers argue that the popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East reinforce the need for Israelis and Palestinians to return to peace talks. In May, US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are expected to lay out their views about how the process should be re-started. However, calls for an immediate resumption of negotiations are unrealistic. The political turmoil across the Arab world is making conditions on the ground – already dire – even less conducive to a lasting settlement. Instead, Europeans and Americans should exploit the hiatus created by current regional instability to encourage Palestinians to end their divisions and hold long-overdue elections before October. The EU and the US should also prod Israel to offer the prospect of serious peace talks to whoever wins those elections.
Western diplomats calling for progress in the peace process in response to the upheaval in the Arab world make two arguments. First they point out that Israel could end up with neighbours which are even more hostile to it. There is significant uncertainty about the makeup of the next leadership in Egypt – a key ally of Israel in recent decades. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that regimes in neighbouring countries, such as Syria and Jordan, will fall. In each of these countries, there are groups that are more hostile to Israel than the regimes which have governed in recent years. To limit the scope for conflict, some diplomats argue, Israel should solve its dispute with the Palestinians as soon as possible.
The second argument advanced by western diplomats is that if Israeli and Palestinian leaders do not make progress towards a final negotiated agreement soon, Palestinians in the West Bank might feel emboldened by the popular movements in other Arab countries – and start protesting against Israel or the local Palestinian authorities. In recent years, there have been relatively few protests within the West Bank, governed by moderate President Mahmoud Abbas, either against the Palestinian authorities or Israel. This is in stark contrast to Gaza, which since 2007 has been run by a more radical Palestinian faction, Hamas, and where many militant groups have been protesting violently against Israel, not least through rocket attacks. Some Gazans have already been inspired by the Arab spring, and held marches against Hamas' rule and calling for new elections.
While these arguments are valid, the upheaval across North Africa and the Middle East precludes a diplomatic breakthrough over the next few months. Even before the wave of popular uprisings, the realities on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian Territories stalled the successive diplomatic efforts of the Obama administration (and previously those of the Bush administration): since 2007, the US has been attempting to negotiate a peace deal between the Israeli government and President Abbas. At the same time, Washington, as well as the EU and Israel, have isolated the rulers of Gaza. But Abbas's credibility as a negotiator has been seriously undermined because he has not spoken on behalf of all the Palestinians. To make matters worse, recent Israeli governments have included political parties strongly opposed to negotiating certain key aspects of the peace process – including the withdrawal of illegal settlements in the West Bank or sharing Jerusalem.
The uprisings in Egypt and elsewhere in the region have thrown up two new obstacles: several Arab governments are shaky or in transition, which means they cannot commit to normalising their relations with Israel - a key component of a peace deal for any Israeli government. Second, Hamas is holding out hopes that regional power shifts – in particular the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - will strengthen their position vis-à-vis President Abbas and his Fatah party. As a result, Hamas is now even less inclined to support peace efforts led by Abbas.
If the US initiates another push for immediate peace talks between Netanyahu and Abbas under current circumstances, they are most likely to flounder. Another diplomatic failure would fuel further disillusionment amongst the Palestinian population. It also risks strengthening calls from the political leadership in the West Bank to secure unilaterally the recognition of the state of Palestine at the UN – which would further complicate eventual peace talks and risk cementing divisions between Gaza and the West Bank.
Instead, over the next few months, the US, the EU and Israel should try to eliminate one of the key obstacles to peace – the lack of a united Palestinian government. Both Fatah and Hamas have repeatedly called for Palestinian reunification over the years, but their mutual antipathy has blighted several reconciliation efforts. However, Abbas has also been held back because Israel has stressed that if the Palestinian President were to form a government of national unity with Hamas, Israel would rule out peace talks. And the US and the EU have threatened to cut off their generous funding to the Palestinian Authority – although the EU has slightly relaxed its position in recent years.
The next deadline for the long-overdue Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections is October 2011. The US and the EU should encourage Israel to make an offer to the Palestinians: if Palestinians hold elections in both the West Bank and Gaza before October, Israel will be open to peace talks with the resulting united Palestinian government, even if it contains members of Hamas – so long as they no longer resort to violence. In the meantime, Israel could demonstrate its good faith by improving conditions on the ground, notably by halting settlement building and removing further roadblocks in the West Bank.
There is a risk that reuniting the Palestinian factions would weaken President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad – two figures who have shown a strong commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and who have succeeded in improving the economy of the West Bank. But it is a risk worth taking, particularly because, according to polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in March 2011, Abbas would win the presidential election and Fatah would receive 40 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections (while Hamas would only secure 26 per cent). Even if Hamas were to fare better in the elections, having members of Hamas in a government of national unity would be better than leaving the group in continued isolation: over the nearly four years since Hamas has been in sole control of Gaza, Israeli border closures and military strikes (in response to the sustained rocket attacks) have led to poverty and alienation amongst the population of Gaza. And Hamas and other militant groups have built a significant military arsenal in preparation for another conflict with Israel – in large part with the help of Iran.
The Arab spring makes the continued boycott of Hamas even more problematic. The upheaval in Egypt is giving more room for manoeuvre to militant groups and outside actors - including Iran - within its Sinai region which borders Israel. Moreover, future governments in Egypt, Tunisia and possibly other countries in the region, may well contain Islamist groups. Having to deal with such groups is likely to make it harder for the EU and the US to continue sidelining Hamas.
If Israel, the US and the EU help to reunite the Palestinians over the next few months, they will limit the influence of nefarious groups in and around Gaza. They will incorporate Hamas into the political process at a time when the group has less popular support than moderate Palestinian factions. And importantly, Israelis and Palestinians will be putting themselves in a much stronger position to secure a lasting peace when the turmoil in their neighbourhood starts to settle.
Clara Marina O'Donnell is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
Many western diplomats and observers argue that the popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East reinforce the need for Israelis and Palestinians to return to peace talks. In May, US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are expected to lay out their views about how the process should be re-started. However, calls for an immediate resumption of negotiations are unrealistic. The political turmoil across the Arab world is making conditions on the ground – already dire – even less conducive to a lasting settlement. Instead, Europeans and Americans should exploit the hiatus created by current regional instability to encourage Palestinians to end their divisions and hold long-overdue elections before October. The EU and the US should also prod Israel to offer the prospect of serious peace talks to whoever wins those elections.
Western diplomats calling for progress in the peace process in response to the upheaval in the Arab world make two arguments. First they point out that Israel could end up with neighbours which are even more hostile to it. There is significant uncertainty about the makeup of the next leadership in Egypt – a key ally of Israel in recent decades. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that regimes in neighbouring countries, such as Syria and Jordan, will fall. In each of these countries, there are groups that are more hostile to Israel than the regimes which have governed in recent years. To limit the scope for conflict, some diplomats argue, Israel should solve its dispute with the Palestinians as soon as possible.
The second argument advanced by western diplomats is that if Israeli and Palestinian leaders do not make progress towards a final negotiated agreement soon, Palestinians in the West Bank might feel emboldened by the popular movements in other Arab countries – and start protesting against Israel or the local Palestinian authorities. In recent years, there have been relatively few protests within the West Bank, governed by moderate President Mahmoud Abbas, either against the Palestinian authorities or Israel. This is in stark contrast to Gaza, which since 2007 has been run by a more radical Palestinian faction, Hamas, and where many militant groups have been protesting violently against Israel, not least through rocket attacks. Some Gazans have already been inspired by the Arab spring, and held marches against Hamas' rule and calling for new elections.
While these arguments are valid, the upheaval across North Africa and the Middle East precludes a diplomatic breakthrough over the next few months. Even before the wave of popular uprisings, the realities on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian Territories stalled the successive diplomatic efforts of the Obama administration (and previously those of the Bush administration): since 2007, the US has been attempting to negotiate a peace deal between the Israeli government and President Abbas. At the same time, Washington, as well as the EU and Israel, have isolated the rulers of Gaza. But Abbas's credibility as a negotiator has been seriously undermined because he has not spoken on behalf of all the Palestinians. To make matters worse, recent Israeli governments have included political parties strongly opposed to negotiating certain key aspects of the peace process – including the withdrawal of illegal settlements in the West Bank or sharing Jerusalem.
The uprisings in Egypt and elsewhere in the region have thrown up two new obstacles: several Arab governments are shaky or in transition, which means they cannot commit to normalising their relations with Israel - a key component of a peace deal for any Israeli government. Second, Hamas is holding out hopes that regional power shifts – in particular the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - will strengthen their position vis-à-vis President Abbas and his Fatah party. As a result, Hamas is now even less inclined to support peace efforts led by Abbas.
If the US initiates another push for immediate peace talks between Netanyahu and Abbas under current circumstances, they are most likely to flounder. Another diplomatic failure would fuel further disillusionment amongst the Palestinian population. It also risks strengthening calls from the political leadership in the West Bank to secure unilaterally the recognition of the state of Palestine at the UN – which would further complicate eventual peace talks and risk cementing divisions between Gaza and the West Bank.
Instead, over the next few months, the US, the EU and Israel should try to eliminate one of the key obstacles to peace – the lack of a united Palestinian government. Both Fatah and Hamas have repeatedly called for Palestinian reunification over the years, but their mutual antipathy has blighted several reconciliation efforts. However, Abbas has also been held back because Israel has stressed that if the Palestinian President were to form a government of national unity with Hamas, Israel would rule out peace talks. And the US and the EU have threatened to cut off their generous funding to the Palestinian Authority – although the EU has slightly relaxed its position in recent years.
The next deadline for the long-overdue Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections is October 2011. The US and the EU should encourage Israel to make an offer to the Palestinians: if Palestinians hold elections in both the West Bank and Gaza before October, Israel will be open to peace talks with the resulting united Palestinian government, even if it contains members of Hamas – so long as they no longer resort to violence. In the meantime, Israel could demonstrate its good faith by improving conditions on the ground, notably by halting settlement building and removing further roadblocks in the West Bank.
There is a risk that reuniting the Palestinian factions would weaken President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad – two figures who have shown a strong commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and who have succeeded in improving the economy of the West Bank. But it is a risk worth taking, particularly because, according to polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in March 2011, Abbas would win the presidential election and Fatah would receive 40 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections (while Hamas would only secure 26 per cent). Even if Hamas were to fare better in the elections, having members of Hamas in a government of national unity would be better than leaving the group in continued isolation: over the nearly four years since Hamas has been in sole control of Gaza, Israeli border closures and military strikes (in response to the sustained rocket attacks) have led to poverty and alienation amongst the population of Gaza. And Hamas and other militant groups have built a significant military arsenal in preparation for another conflict with Israel – in large part with the help of Iran.
The Arab spring makes the continued boycott of Hamas even more problematic. The upheaval in Egypt is giving more room for manoeuvre to militant groups and outside actors - including Iran - within its Sinai region which borders Israel. Moreover, future governments in Egypt, Tunisia and possibly other countries in the region, may well contain Islamist groups. Having to deal with such groups is likely to make it harder for the EU and the US to continue sidelining Hamas.
If Israel, the US and the EU help to reunite the Palestinians over the next few months, they will limit the influence of nefarious groups in and around Gaza. They will incorporate Hamas into the political process at a time when the group has less popular support than moderate Palestinian factions. And importantly, Israelis and Palestinians will be putting themselves in a much stronger position to secure a lasting peace when the turmoil in their neighbourhood starts to settle.
Clara Marina O'Donnell is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
Friday, April 08, 2011
The June European Council: Migrants on their minds
by Hugo Brady
In June, EU leaders will meet in Brussels for their next quarterly summit chaired by Council President Herman Van Rompuy. Some of them – Britain's David Cameron and France's Nicolas Sarkozy – are currently fighting a war in Libya. Others, like Angela Merkel and Silvio Berlusconi, are facing political upheaval at home. European leaders from both north and south are watching anxiously as the markets continue to pound the euro. But everyone – apart perhaps from the newer members to the east – is worried about immigration. Hence, if events allow, Van Rompuy wants to focus the forthcoming meeting on border control, immigration and refugee policy.
This could easily become a bad tempered, inconclusive affair. First, the summit is supposed to take a broad strategic view of EU immigration and asylum policies. But instability in North Africa will inevitably skew discussion towards the present. Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's prime minister, is adamant that his country needs help to manage a "human tsunami" from Libya and Tunisia. Berlusconi's demands for “solidarity” from fellow EU countries essentially mean their agreement to take in some of the 20,000 or so migrants currently housed in tent camps on the island of Lampedusa and in the mainland region of Puglia. The EU has committed money, a humanitarian mission and border guards from its Frontex border agency. Nonetheless, the Italians want more help. The country’s ‘realist’ immigration policy – heavily reliant on co-operation with dictators such as Muammar Gaddafi and Tunisia’s Ben Ali – is in tatters following EU-supported uprisings.
EU refugee rules say that migrants who claim asylum must be accepted by the first member country they reach. Exceptions can only be made in an emergency if overwhelming numbers suddenly arrive en masse. Although 20,000 is a large number of people, it is nowhere near the influx that followed the 1999 Kosovo war. Then, Albanian Kosovars fled to Western Europe in their hundreds of thousands leading EU governments to provide for some deviation to the first-country-of-arrival rule. Furthermore, several North European countries – including, in this instance, France – typically accept more asylum seekers than Italy, both proportionately and in overall numbers. As it stands, the current situation will not prompt the re-think demanded by Italy, Malta and some other Mediterranean member-states.
Second, European leaders back an EU immigration policy only in so far as it means tighter border controls and more repatriation. To satisfy this demand, the European Commission has proposed giving Frontex more powers and is due to publish in 2012 a raft of legislation intended to upgrade Schengen area border controls with new technology. EU countries have little interest in the Commission’s other ideas to facilitate more legal immigration, however. This was true even when Europe’s economic conditions were favourable and unemployment relatively low. But the creation of more legal migration routes into the EU, like a single European residency permit, would greatly strengthen the Commission's hand in negotiations with neighbouring countries on border checks and the return of unauthorised immigrants.
Third, EU leaders have discussed all of these issues before and achieved little. In 2008, they signed a European 'migration pact' at the urging of France, when summit agendas were still set by a different rotating presidency every six months. The pact declared that the free movement of people between EU countries and the existence of the Schengen area of passport-free travel meant that national immigration policies must also be linked. The text committed all member-states to tighter border controls and more repatriation of immigrants illegally resident on their territories. But – like the Union for the Mediterranean agreed the same year – the pact's confident language and forthright assertions failed to make much difference in practice.
Given that several EU leaders are vulnerable to political challenges at home from the far right, the temptation to push immigration policy upwards to the European level is understandable. But the idea that 'Europe' will help to reduce illegal immigration dramatically is largely an illusion. An EU immigration policy will not of itself drastically decrease the numbers of unskilled migrants arriving on European shores or over-staying tourist visas. Immigration trends are driven by so-called push and pull factors: disparities of wealth, the contrast between instability at home and the high quality of life in Europe, and demand for cheap labour. And even enlightened policies aimed at discouraging emigration from migrants' home countries – trade liberalisation and development aid – tend to produce ambiguous effects. Conditions improve in the poorer country but so too does the mobility of its people and their aspiration for a better life abroad.
With maddening constraints like these, what can Van Rompuy credibly hope to achieve in June? To start with, he can try to steer the talks away from demands for solidarity to a concept he has stressed during the eurozone crisis: mutual responsibility. In the immigration context, this would mean that EU countries need to work together much more pro-actively to prevent future migratory pressures endangering free movement and passport-free travel. One idea would be to create bilateral partnerships between EU countries that struggle to maintain the external border and those that have resources to spare or face less migratory pressure. These partnerships would involve core teams of experts with the relevant skills being seconded to external border countries for long periods. In addition, Van Rompuy could open a debate on whether the creation of a European border guard – EU officials with powers to direct Schengen country border controls – might be necessary.
The EU has four funds for helping member-states to return illegal immigrants, integrate minorities, care for refugees and maintain modern border controls. Taken together, these account for 0.5 per cent (around €550 million) of the EU's annual budget. With inward migration to Europe more likely to rise than fall in the coming years, President Van Rompuy could propose to the assembled leaders that they agree now to double the amount of money allocated to these funds in the next EU multi-annual budget for 2014-2021.
Lastly, Van Rompuy could take forward calls from Germany for the EU to conclude 'mobility partnerships' on immigration with Egypt and Tunisia. These are agreements – managed by the European Commission – whereby some EU countries offer temporary work visas to citizens of a country that, in return, collaborates on border checks and repatriation. Here Van Rompuy could go further and propose that those countries that adhere in practice to UN accords banning the use of torture and providing for refugee protection would be entitled to much more generous terms than those that do not. By encouraging neighbouring countries to treat their own refugees better, the EU would begin to extend the concept of mutual responsibility beyond its own borders. When ready, Libya too should be offered this choice.
The president of the European Council might consider these initiatives too piecemeal to offer to EU leaders as solutions to their immigration worries. They do not amount to a grand European bargain on migration. But, as he watches the black cars pull up in June, Van Rompuy might recall a favourite motto of Pope John 23rd: "See all. Forgive much. Change a little."
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
In June, EU leaders will meet in Brussels for their next quarterly summit chaired by Council President Herman Van Rompuy. Some of them – Britain's David Cameron and France's Nicolas Sarkozy – are currently fighting a war in Libya. Others, like Angela Merkel and Silvio Berlusconi, are facing political upheaval at home. European leaders from both north and south are watching anxiously as the markets continue to pound the euro. But everyone – apart perhaps from the newer members to the east – is worried about immigration. Hence, if events allow, Van Rompuy wants to focus the forthcoming meeting on border control, immigration and refugee policy.
This could easily become a bad tempered, inconclusive affair. First, the summit is supposed to take a broad strategic view of EU immigration and asylum policies. But instability in North Africa will inevitably skew discussion towards the present. Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's prime minister, is adamant that his country needs help to manage a "human tsunami" from Libya and Tunisia. Berlusconi's demands for “solidarity” from fellow EU countries essentially mean their agreement to take in some of the 20,000 or so migrants currently housed in tent camps on the island of Lampedusa and in the mainland region of Puglia. The EU has committed money, a humanitarian mission and border guards from its Frontex border agency. Nonetheless, the Italians want more help. The country’s ‘realist’ immigration policy – heavily reliant on co-operation with dictators such as Muammar Gaddafi and Tunisia’s Ben Ali – is in tatters following EU-supported uprisings.
EU refugee rules say that migrants who claim asylum must be accepted by the first member country they reach. Exceptions can only be made in an emergency if overwhelming numbers suddenly arrive en masse. Although 20,000 is a large number of people, it is nowhere near the influx that followed the 1999 Kosovo war. Then, Albanian Kosovars fled to Western Europe in their hundreds of thousands leading EU governments to provide for some deviation to the first-country-of-arrival rule. Furthermore, several North European countries – including, in this instance, France – typically accept more asylum seekers than Italy, both proportionately and in overall numbers. As it stands, the current situation will not prompt the re-think demanded by Italy, Malta and some other Mediterranean member-states.
Second, European leaders back an EU immigration policy only in so far as it means tighter border controls and more repatriation. To satisfy this demand, the European Commission has proposed giving Frontex more powers and is due to publish in 2012 a raft of legislation intended to upgrade Schengen area border controls with new technology. EU countries have little interest in the Commission’s other ideas to facilitate more legal immigration, however. This was true even when Europe’s economic conditions were favourable and unemployment relatively low. But the creation of more legal migration routes into the EU, like a single European residency permit, would greatly strengthen the Commission's hand in negotiations with neighbouring countries on border checks and the return of unauthorised immigrants.
Third, EU leaders have discussed all of these issues before and achieved little. In 2008, they signed a European 'migration pact' at the urging of France, when summit agendas were still set by a different rotating presidency every six months. The pact declared that the free movement of people between EU countries and the existence of the Schengen area of passport-free travel meant that national immigration policies must also be linked. The text committed all member-states to tighter border controls and more repatriation of immigrants illegally resident on their territories. But – like the Union for the Mediterranean agreed the same year – the pact's confident language and forthright assertions failed to make much difference in practice.
Given that several EU leaders are vulnerable to political challenges at home from the far right, the temptation to push immigration policy upwards to the European level is understandable. But the idea that 'Europe' will help to reduce illegal immigration dramatically is largely an illusion. An EU immigration policy will not of itself drastically decrease the numbers of unskilled migrants arriving on European shores or over-staying tourist visas. Immigration trends are driven by so-called push and pull factors: disparities of wealth, the contrast between instability at home and the high quality of life in Europe, and demand for cheap labour. And even enlightened policies aimed at discouraging emigration from migrants' home countries – trade liberalisation and development aid – tend to produce ambiguous effects. Conditions improve in the poorer country but so too does the mobility of its people and their aspiration for a better life abroad.
With maddening constraints like these, what can Van Rompuy credibly hope to achieve in June? To start with, he can try to steer the talks away from demands for solidarity to a concept he has stressed during the eurozone crisis: mutual responsibility. In the immigration context, this would mean that EU countries need to work together much more pro-actively to prevent future migratory pressures endangering free movement and passport-free travel. One idea would be to create bilateral partnerships between EU countries that struggle to maintain the external border and those that have resources to spare or face less migratory pressure. These partnerships would involve core teams of experts with the relevant skills being seconded to external border countries for long periods. In addition, Van Rompuy could open a debate on whether the creation of a European border guard – EU officials with powers to direct Schengen country border controls – might be necessary.
The EU has four funds for helping member-states to return illegal immigrants, integrate minorities, care for refugees and maintain modern border controls. Taken together, these account for 0.5 per cent (around €550 million) of the EU's annual budget. With inward migration to Europe more likely to rise than fall in the coming years, President Van Rompuy could propose to the assembled leaders that they agree now to double the amount of money allocated to these funds in the next EU multi-annual budget for 2014-2021.
Lastly, Van Rompuy could take forward calls from Germany for the EU to conclude 'mobility partnerships' on immigration with Egypt and Tunisia. These are agreements – managed by the European Commission – whereby some EU countries offer temporary work visas to citizens of a country that, in return, collaborates on border checks and repatriation. Here Van Rompuy could go further and propose that those countries that adhere in practice to UN accords banning the use of torture and providing for refugee protection would be entitled to much more generous terms than those that do not. By encouraging neighbouring countries to treat their own refugees better, the EU would begin to extend the concept of mutual responsibility beyond its own borders. When ready, Libya too should be offered this choice.
The president of the European Council might consider these initiatives too piecemeal to offer to EU leaders as solutions to their immigration worries. They do not amount to a grand European bargain on migration. But, as he watches the black cars pull up in June, Van Rompuy might recall a favourite motto of Pope John 23rd: "See all. Forgive much. Change a little."
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Europe's damaging obsession with 'competitiveness'
by Simon Tilford
Many European policy-makers and business leaders believe that a country's economic growth prospects depend on its ability to capture a growing share of global markets. Indeed, European policy-makers are obsessed with national 'competitiveness' and genuinely appear to think that prosperity is synonymous with trade surpluses. Of course, imports have to be financed by exports. But the focus on trade competitiveness risks drawing attention away from Europe’s underlying problem, which is very weak productivity growth.
The idea of economic growth being determined by a battle for global market shares in manufactured goods is easy for politicians to grasp and to communicate to their electorates. Countries have little in common with firms, but referring to Deutschland AG, or UK plc, is conceptually attractive and seductively easy. Economies running external surpluses are regarded as 'competitive' irrespective of their productivity or growth performance. The trade balance is seen as a country's 'bottom line', as if countries were firms. The trade balance is nothing of the sort, but is simply the difference between domestic savings and investment or more broadly, between aggregate spending and output.
Governments obsessed with national competitiveness are likely to pursue damaging economic policies. If economic growth is seen as being dependent on the cost competitiveness of exports, governments will focus on things that might make sense for exporters but not for their economies as a whole. A fixation with exports leads to labour market policies aimed at artificially holding down wage growth, which redistributes income from labour to capital and exacerbates inequality. The secular decline in the proportion of national income accounted for by wages and salaries over the last 10 years in nearly every EU economy is a major obstacle to a recovery in private consumption. The flipside of the decline in wage and salaries – a steep rise in the proportion of national income accounted for by corporate profits – has not resulted in booming investment. This is no surprise. An individual firm can cut wages without undermining demand for whatever good or service it produces. But this does not work if all firms attempt this simultaneously. The resulting weakness of overall demand depresses companies' incentives to invest, and with it productivity growth.
In short, cutting the proportion of national income accounted for by wages, accepting a secular rise in inequality and boosting the proportion of national income accounted for by corporate profits is no way to deliver sustainable economic expansion. But it is what happens when governments believe that economic salvation lies in winning a growing share of export markets.
The EU's economic prospects will largely be down to its domestic rate of productivity, not the size of its trade surplus. There is a very strong correlation between growth in labour productivity and economic growth, which holds for countries with trade surpluses as well as those with deficits.
Unfortunately, the data show a remarkable decline in productivity growth across Europe, from around 3.5 per cent annually in the 1970s to barely 1 per cent in the 2000s. And productivity growth has been almost as weak in the eurozone's core as in its troubled periphery. Governments across the region should focus on raising productivity – not just in the most internationally exposed sectors like manufacturing, but in less tradeable sectors such as services too. Service sectors now account for around two-thirds of economic activity. Without stronger productivity across the service sector economic growth will prove elusive.
Why has Europe's productivity performance, with a few notable exceptions been so bad? There are two core problems. The first is inadequate skills levels. Europeans are terrifically complacent about labour skills. Some countries – the Nordics, the Netherlands – do well. The picture elsewhere is patchy at best. Germany has good vocational training, Britain more than its fair share of top universities, France good technical education. Other countries, especially in the south, perform poorly in most areas. The second cause is inadequate competition. In too many sectors, incumbents are protected. This is justified in terms of upholding 'social justice' or defending 'national champions'. What it leads to is so-called rent-seeking; the ability of particular groups in society to extract disproportionate rewards for their work. Where this tendency is strongest, productivity levels are weakest.
Europe's economic growth prospects may be poor. But this has little to do with what is happening elsewhere. Europe’s leaders will find that improving education and throwing open hitherto protected markets is a long and arduous task. But unlike the obsession with 'competitiveness' such reforms will lead Europe onto the path of sustainable growth.
Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.
Many European policy-makers and business leaders believe that a country's economic growth prospects depend on its ability to capture a growing share of global markets. Indeed, European policy-makers are obsessed with national 'competitiveness' and genuinely appear to think that prosperity is synonymous with trade surpluses. Of course, imports have to be financed by exports. But the focus on trade competitiveness risks drawing attention away from Europe’s underlying problem, which is very weak productivity growth.
The idea of economic growth being determined by a battle for global market shares in manufactured goods is easy for politicians to grasp and to communicate to their electorates. Countries have little in common with firms, but referring to Deutschland AG, or UK plc, is conceptually attractive and seductively easy. Economies running external surpluses are regarded as 'competitive' irrespective of their productivity or growth performance. The trade balance is seen as a country's 'bottom line', as if countries were firms. The trade balance is nothing of the sort, but is simply the difference between domestic savings and investment or more broadly, between aggregate spending and output.
Governments obsessed with national competitiveness are likely to pursue damaging economic policies. If economic growth is seen as being dependent on the cost competitiveness of exports, governments will focus on things that might make sense for exporters but not for their economies as a whole. A fixation with exports leads to labour market policies aimed at artificially holding down wage growth, which redistributes income from labour to capital and exacerbates inequality. The secular decline in the proportion of national income accounted for by wages and salaries over the last 10 years in nearly every EU economy is a major obstacle to a recovery in private consumption. The flipside of the decline in wage and salaries – a steep rise in the proportion of national income accounted for by corporate profits – has not resulted in booming investment. This is no surprise. An individual firm can cut wages without undermining demand for whatever good or service it produces. But this does not work if all firms attempt this simultaneously. The resulting weakness of overall demand depresses companies' incentives to invest, and with it productivity growth.
In short, cutting the proportion of national income accounted for by wages, accepting a secular rise in inequality and boosting the proportion of national income accounted for by corporate profits is no way to deliver sustainable economic expansion. But it is what happens when governments believe that economic salvation lies in winning a growing share of export markets.
The EU's economic prospects will largely be down to its domestic rate of productivity, not the size of its trade surplus. There is a very strong correlation between growth in labour productivity and economic growth, which holds for countries with trade surpluses as well as those with deficits.
Unfortunately, the data show a remarkable decline in productivity growth across Europe, from around 3.5 per cent annually in the 1970s to barely 1 per cent in the 2000s. And productivity growth has been almost as weak in the eurozone's core as in its troubled periphery. Governments across the region should focus on raising productivity – not just in the most internationally exposed sectors like manufacturing, but in less tradeable sectors such as services too. Service sectors now account for around two-thirds of economic activity. Without stronger productivity across the service sector economic growth will prove elusive.
Why has Europe's productivity performance, with a few notable exceptions been so bad? There are two core problems. The first is inadequate skills levels. Europeans are terrifically complacent about labour skills. Some countries – the Nordics, the Netherlands – do well. The picture elsewhere is patchy at best. Germany has good vocational training, Britain more than its fair share of top universities, France good technical education. Other countries, especially in the south, perform poorly in most areas. The second cause is inadequate competition. In too many sectors, incumbents are protected. This is justified in terms of upholding 'social justice' or defending 'national champions'. What it leads to is so-called rent-seeking; the ability of particular groups in society to extract disproportionate rewards for their work. Where this tendency is strongest, productivity levels are weakest.
Europe's economic growth prospects may be poor. But this has little to do with what is happening elsewhere. Europe’s leaders will find that improving education and throwing open hitherto protected markets is a long and arduous task. But unlike the obsession with 'competitiveness' such reforms will lead Europe onto the path of sustainable growth.
Simon Tilford is chief economist at the Centre for European Reform.
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Turkey, the EU and the Mediterranean uprisings
by Katinka Barysch
The revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have brought home to many people that Turkey has become a force to be reckoned with in this region. Turkey enjoys lots of credibility in the Arab world. It has burgeoning trade ties and solid political relations with many Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries. As the EU scrambles to revamp its own neighbourhood policy, it would do well to work closely with Turkey. Turkey would also gain. Sadly, there is little evidence of such co-operation to date.
Asked at a recent Aspen roundtable in Istanbul whether the EU and Turkey were co-ordinating their responses to the revolts in the Arab world, Ali Babacan, a veteran minister in the Erdogan government, said: "We work a lot with the Americans, like we do on Afghanistan, but not with Europe." The main reason, he said, was that his country's plan to join the EU was going nowhere.
The EU - in acknowledgement of Turkey’s growing international clout - has offered Ankara a foreign policy dialogue outside the accession process. But the dialogue has yet to start in earnest. Most of the interaction between Turkey and the EU still revolves around a largely blocked accession process. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu - at the same Aspen roundtable - added a second reason why foreign policy co-ordination had been slow to get off the ground. Turkey, he explained, did not bother to work with the EU because the EU's own neighbourhood policy was weak and inconsistent.
Davutoglu and his colleagues in Ankara should reconsider. The uprisings in the Arab world are spurring the EU to rethink its neighbourhood policy (see Charles Grant, 'A new neighbourhood policy for the EU'). They could also wreck Turkey's 'zero problems with the neighbours' approach to its region - which is already in trouble after Turkish attempts to mediate in several regional conflicts failed and Ankara fell out with Israel.
Although today's Turkey likes to see itself as a regional leader, its influence in the Middle East, and even more so in the Maghreb, is still rather fresh and fragile. During the Cold War years, Turkey was largely isolated in its neighbourhood. It clung to its NATO allies while viewing its southern neighbours as sources of Islamic extremism, Kurdish separatism and other potential security threats.
In the 1990s, there were initial attempts to make up with old adversaries like Syria and Iran. These accelerated after the AK party took power in 2002. Turkish mediation efforts, for example between Israel and Syria or Iran and the West, have produced no tangible results. But over the last decade, Turkey has created a web of political, economic and civil society ties with almost all of the countries around its borders. Turkey has scrapped visa requirements for Syrians, Tunisians, Lebanese, Libyans and Moroccans; it is building a free trade zone with various Mediterranean countries; and Turkish traders, builders and bankers are active across the region, as are Turkish business federations and other non-governmental organisations.
Bizarrely, as Kemal Kirisci points out in a recent GMF-IAI paper ('Turkey: Reluctant Mediteranean power'), Turkey's neighbourhood policy has moved from its security-obsessed origins to good old-fashioned European functionalism – the belief that economic integration and lots of low-level exchanges will bring political understanding and stability. The EU's Mediterranean policy has also involved scrapping trade barriers. And it talks about nice things such as democracy and good governance. But in reality it has taken a security-first approach, focusing mainly on fighting terrorism, fundamentalism, and illegal migration.
The revolts in Northern Africa have already forced the EU to think harder about how to help introduce democracy and create economic opportunities in its southern neighbours. Turkey, meanwhile, will probably move security back to the heart of its neighbourhood policy, especially if political upheaval spreads closer to its borders, and if some of the new regimes in the region start quarrelling with Israel or Iran.
Both Turkey and the EU will grapple with finding a balance between the objectives of stability and democracy in their neighbourhood policies. Unlike the EU, Turkey has not in the past claimed to be promoting democracy in the Arab world. Erdogan has managed to gain the admiration of the Arab street - partly through supporting Palestinians and criticising Israel - while at the same time snuggling up to some of the region’s most autocratic rulers, including Colonel Gaddafi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan's initial reaction to the Arab uprisings was equally inconsistent. He called on Egypt's President Mubarak to leave and he welcomed Tunisia's move to democracy. But in the case of Libya, Erdogan has been holding out against sanctions and any kind of military intervention. And he has never criticised Ahmadinejad for rigging elections or Assad for clamping down on his opponents. In the new political environment, Turkey's standing in the Arab world will suffer unless its approach to democracy promotion becomes more coherent and consistent.
Turkey's ruling AK party, which itself has some roots in outlawed Islamist forces, has strengthened ties with various Islamist movements in its neighbourhood, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The AKP could help turn such movements into electable political parties. However, at a time when the Erdogan government is accused of moving towards religious conservatism and political authoritarianism, collaboration with Islamists elsewhere would scare people inside Turkey and outside. They would ask whether Turkey was trying to promote democracy or Islamism in its foreign relations. Such suspicions would be mitigated if the AKP's ties with Islamists in Egypt and elsewhere were part of an EU-supported democratisation and institution-building programme.
The EU would also benefit greatly from working with Turkey - and not only because Turkey brings valuable regional links and expertise to the table. Having lost much of its kudos by focusing aid and political attentions on various autocratic regimes, the EU could regain soft power by working with Turkey - a country that still enjoys much esteem across the Arab world.
The revamp of respective neighbourhood policies could be an opportunity for the EU and Turkey to get serious about foreign policy co-ordination and thus improve their strained bilateral ties. Co-operation should go beyond political dialogue between Brussels and Ankara and involve business federations, foundations and other non-governmental organisations that can help Mediterranean countries become more stable and prosperous. Without this kind of co-ordination, rivalries and misunderstandings between the EU and Turkey could further undermine their bilateral relationship and the effectiveness of their respective neighbourhood policies.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
The revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have brought home to many people that Turkey has become a force to be reckoned with in this region. Turkey enjoys lots of credibility in the Arab world. It has burgeoning trade ties and solid political relations with many Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries. As the EU scrambles to revamp its own neighbourhood policy, it would do well to work closely with Turkey. Turkey would also gain. Sadly, there is little evidence of such co-operation to date.
Asked at a recent Aspen roundtable in Istanbul whether the EU and Turkey were co-ordinating their responses to the revolts in the Arab world, Ali Babacan, a veteran minister in the Erdogan government, said: "We work a lot with the Americans, like we do on Afghanistan, but not with Europe." The main reason, he said, was that his country's plan to join the EU was going nowhere.
The EU - in acknowledgement of Turkey’s growing international clout - has offered Ankara a foreign policy dialogue outside the accession process. But the dialogue has yet to start in earnest. Most of the interaction between Turkey and the EU still revolves around a largely blocked accession process. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu - at the same Aspen roundtable - added a second reason why foreign policy co-ordination had been slow to get off the ground. Turkey, he explained, did not bother to work with the EU because the EU's own neighbourhood policy was weak and inconsistent.
Davutoglu and his colleagues in Ankara should reconsider. The uprisings in the Arab world are spurring the EU to rethink its neighbourhood policy (see Charles Grant, 'A new neighbourhood policy for the EU'). They could also wreck Turkey's 'zero problems with the neighbours' approach to its region - which is already in trouble after Turkish attempts to mediate in several regional conflicts failed and Ankara fell out with Israel.
Although today's Turkey likes to see itself as a regional leader, its influence in the Middle East, and even more so in the Maghreb, is still rather fresh and fragile. During the Cold War years, Turkey was largely isolated in its neighbourhood. It clung to its NATO allies while viewing its southern neighbours as sources of Islamic extremism, Kurdish separatism and other potential security threats.
In the 1990s, there were initial attempts to make up with old adversaries like Syria and Iran. These accelerated after the AK party took power in 2002. Turkish mediation efforts, for example between Israel and Syria or Iran and the West, have produced no tangible results. But over the last decade, Turkey has created a web of political, economic and civil society ties with almost all of the countries around its borders. Turkey has scrapped visa requirements for Syrians, Tunisians, Lebanese, Libyans and Moroccans; it is building a free trade zone with various Mediterranean countries; and Turkish traders, builders and bankers are active across the region, as are Turkish business federations and other non-governmental organisations.
Bizarrely, as Kemal Kirisci points out in a recent GMF-IAI paper ('Turkey: Reluctant Mediteranean power'), Turkey's neighbourhood policy has moved from its security-obsessed origins to good old-fashioned European functionalism – the belief that economic integration and lots of low-level exchanges will bring political understanding and stability. The EU's Mediterranean policy has also involved scrapping trade barriers. And it talks about nice things such as democracy and good governance. But in reality it has taken a security-first approach, focusing mainly on fighting terrorism, fundamentalism, and illegal migration.
The revolts in Northern Africa have already forced the EU to think harder about how to help introduce democracy and create economic opportunities in its southern neighbours. Turkey, meanwhile, will probably move security back to the heart of its neighbourhood policy, especially if political upheaval spreads closer to its borders, and if some of the new regimes in the region start quarrelling with Israel or Iran.
Both Turkey and the EU will grapple with finding a balance between the objectives of stability and democracy in their neighbourhood policies. Unlike the EU, Turkey has not in the past claimed to be promoting democracy in the Arab world. Erdogan has managed to gain the admiration of the Arab street - partly through supporting Palestinians and criticising Israel - while at the same time snuggling up to some of the region’s most autocratic rulers, including Colonel Gaddafi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan's initial reaction to the Arab uprisings was equally inconsistent. He called on Egypt's President Mubarak to leave and he welcomed Tunisia's move to democracy. But in the case of Libya, Erdogan has been holding out against sanctions and any kind of military intervention. And he has never criticised Ahmadinejad for rigging elections or Assad for clamping down on his opponents. In the new political environment, Turkey's standing in the Arab world will suffer unless its approach to democracy promotion becomes more coherent and consistent.
Turkey's ruling AK party, which itself has some roots in outlawed Islamist forces, has strengthened ties with various Islamist movements in its neighbourhood, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The AKP could help turn such movements into electable political parties. However, at a time when the Erdogan government is accused of moving towards religious conservatism and political authoritarianism, collaboration with Islamists elsewhere would scare people inside Turkey and outside. They would ask whether Turkey was trying to promote democracy or Islamism in its foreign relations. Such suspicions would be mitigated if the AKP's ties with Islamists in Egypt and elsewhere were part of an EU-supported democratisation and institution-building programme.
The EU would also benefit greatly from working with Turkey - and not only because Turkey brings valuable regional links and expertise to the table. Having lost much of its kudos by focusing aid and political attentions on various autocratic regimes, the EU could regain soft power by working with Turkey - a country that still enjoys much esteem across the Arab world.
The revamp of respective neighbourhood policies could be an opportunity for the EU and Turkey to get serious about foreign policy co-ordination and thus improve their strained bilateral ties. Co-operation should go beyond political dialogue between Brussels and Ankara and involve business federations, foundations and other non-governmental organisations that can help Mediterranean countries become more stable and prosperous. Without this kind of co-ordination, rivalries and misunderstandings between the EU and Turkey could further undermine their bilateral relationship and the effectiveness of their respective neighbourhood policies.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
What cuts in US defence budget will mean for the transatlantic alliance
by Tomas Valasek
The US defence budget seems set to fall as Washington begins to restore order in its finances. Spending on the military has reached such heights – $700 billion, or 20 per cent of the US federal budget – that it has become too large for deficit-cutters to ignore. Even traditionally pro-defence Republicans now argue that military expenditures need to be reduced along with other government expenses. Europe, too, will feel the pinch: many of the American soldiers currently based on the continent seem certain to go, and some joint weapons programmes will be cancelled. In case of future crises in Europe, NATO’s and the EU’s ability to respond will be tested. The US will expect Europe to lead but European allies themselves have been reducing forces and budgets.
Congress is poised to cut the White House’s request for defence for the fiscal year (FY) 2011 by $15-$20 billion. That might seem low relative to the $700 billion total but of that amount roughly $160 billion is set aside for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will decrease as those conflicts wind down. And much of the remaining money is tied up in non-discretionary spending such as pensions and healthcare for military personnel (the latter alone costs the Pentagon over $50 billion a year). The brunt of the cuts in FY 2011 will therefore fall on the pool of $200-$300 billion that pays for purchases of new equipment, foreign military assistance, overseas bases and non-core military operations. Money spent abroad will be particularly vulnerable to cuts – more and more Americans say that the US government should look after its own rather than, say, wealthy Europeans (all foreign aid is in for big reductions).
The effect of US defence budget cuts on Europe will be five-fold. First, some of the 80,000 US soldiers left in Europe as assurance to NATO allies will most probably leave; Gates said in January 2011 that “it is clear that we have excess force structure in Europe”. The Balts and others in Europe who continue to fear possible trouble with Russia will wonder whether the US has enough forces ready to defend them. But their unease will be tempered by the many military exercises that the US held in the region last year. In 2010, Washington also successfully lobbied the rest of NATO to draft a defence plan for the Baltic. This was done in order to re-affirm US intent to uphold the alliance’s mutual defence pledge, and it seems to have worked: judging by mood at events such as this month’s GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava, the Balts and other Central Europeans are more at ease with Obama. Besides, as Stephen Flanagan of CSIS, a Washington think-tank, points out, “the 50,000 troops that will stay in Europe would be more than double the US ground presence in South Korea, where there is daily risk of imminent war.” Many of the new allies have been busy cutting defence budget themselves: they say that the fiscal crisis leaves them no choice, but the cuts also suggest that they feel little imminent threat from the East. This will make Washington less reticent about withdrawing troops from Europe.
Second, the military assistance that the US provides to help allies to modernise and re-arm will continue to fall. In the past decade, the US generously funded equipment purchases in Europe, with most money going to the new allies. Low-interest US loans allowed Poland to buy F-16 fighter jets, while Romania purchased C-130 cargo planes with US aid. But in recent years, assistance to countries such as Egypt or Pakistan has taken priority – of the $5.4 billion in 'foreign military financing', which the US set aside for 2011, $4.7 billion will go to Middle East and North Africa. The proportion of the aid going to wealthier and less strategic European countries will be slashed further when, as expected, the overall volume of military assistance falls. In the past, US defence companies would have had a decent shot at thwarting cuts in such assistance: they tend to be its main beneficiaries as most of the money ends up with them in the form of procurement orders. But the mood in the US is changing: Republicans in particular argue that the US government should not be in the business of funding new jobs, and that the best job-creation strategy lies in cutting expenses, thus restoring order in the federal budget. Should military assistance to Europe be slashed, as seems likely, programmes such as Romania’s planned purchase of F-16 fighter jets that are financed with US monies would likely be postponed or cancelled. With defence budgets falling in virtually all NATO countries, there is little hope that European allies would pick up the slack.
Third, US personnel on operations in Europe – in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo – will likely be reduced or withdrawn altogether. Because their numbers are low to begin with, the short-term impact will be minimal. Only 20 US soldiers remain in Bosnia in a force that once counted 20,000 American troops. The US has about 800 soldiers left in Kosovo, where the overall NATO force is being reduced from 14,000 to 2,500. Should a new crisis break out in the Balkans, the Pentagon will be able to send more soldiers from bases elsewhere in Europe (primarily Germany). But this reserve force too is being reduced. The downsized Pentagon will be far less willing than in the 1990s to lead military operations in Europe. In the future, Washington will look to its allies to assume main responsibility for dealing with the Balkans and other crises on Europe’s periphery. The defense department’s resistance to a no-fly zone in Libya could be a sign of things to come.
Fourth, those European companies that do business in the US will lose some of their orders – but so will their US competitors. Signs of renewed protectionism have been few so far. While the Pentagon recently chose Boeing over a Franco-German consortium EADS to build a new generation of tanker aircraft, “this is mainly because Boeing’s planes were $2 billion cheaper”, says Andrew Koch, an analyst with Scribe Strategies and Advisors, a Washington consultancy. The European companies have worked hard to erase their US competitors’ advantage: the likes of BAE Systems and EADS pledge to build equipment in the US using American workers, so they are likely to have as many members of Congress on their side as their US counterparts. While competition for US defence contracts will toughen, European companies are not necessarily losing ground to US ones.
Fifth, the future of new weapons funded jointly by the US and its allies is in doubt. Already, the Pentagon has announced that it was pulling out of a US-German-Italian project to build a new generation of medium-range missile defences. This is in large part because the project, MEADS, has suffered technical problems. But the Pentagon, in announcing the decision, also cited financial constraints as a factor. The more the US cuts defence spending, the higher the risk that NATO’s own flagship, continent-wide missile umbrella could be at risk. Announced in November 2010, the system envisions combining future US radars and missiles to be stationed mainly in Central Europe with yet-to-be-developed European sensors and interceptors. But few European governments have come forward pledging money for it. It is not obvious why the US Congress would fund a programme to defend European mainland, which the Europeans themselves are unwilling to support.
Politically, cuts in US defence spending are sure to rankle in Europe. A setback to NATO’s missile defences could be particularly divisive, with new allies lamenting a chance to host US military bases, and with NATO losing one of its key initiatives, which it also has been hoping to use to entice Russia into a closer relationship. The effect of US reductions will be compounded by cuts to military spending in Europe: there is a risk that reductions on one side of the Atlantic will be used to justify corresponding cuts across the sea. NATO remains the most powerful military block in the world but it will lose some of its ability to handle multiple crises simultaneously.
The main challenge for US and European defence communities for the next few years will be to keep NATO’s mutual defence pledge credible: this will require allies to prioritise missions and to hone their ability to diffuse crises before they require deployment of large forces. Even if no such crises occur, the Americans and Europeans will be busy managing the political fallout from cancelled procurement programmes and reduced operations. To minimise damage, the Pentagon should keep allies apprised of its cost-cutting measures. For their part, the Europeans need to co-ordinate better their own reductions in defence budgets, so as to make sure that enough money and resources are left to cover any shortfalls that US cuts will create.
Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.
The US defence budget seems set to fall as Washington begins to restore order in its finances. Spending on the military has reached such heights – $700 billion, or 20 per cent of the US federal budget – that it has become too large for deficit-cutters to ignore. Even traditionally pro-defence Republicans now argue that military expenditures need to be reduced along with other government expenses. Europe, too, will feel the pinch: many of the American soldiers currently based on the continent seem certain to go, and some joint weapons programmes will be cancelled. In case of future crises in Europe, NATO’s and the EU’s ability to respond will be tested. The US will expect Europe to lead but European allies themselves have been reducing forces and budgets.
Congress is poised to cut the White House’s request for defence for the fiscal year (FY) 2011 by $15-$20 billion. That might seem low relative to the $700 billion total but of that amount roughly $160 billion is set aside for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will decrease as those conflicts wind down. And much of the remaining money is tied up in non-discretionary spending such as pensions and healthcare for military personnel (the latter alone costs the Pentagon over $50 billion a year). The brunt of the cuts in FY 2011 will therefore fall on the pool of $200-$300 billion that pays for purchases of new equipment, foreign military assistance, overseas bases and non-core military operations. Money spent abroad will be particularly vulnerable to cuts – more and more Americans say that the US government should look after its own rather than, say, wealthy Europeans (all foreign aid is in for big reductions).
The effect of US defence budget cuts on Europe will be five-fold. First, some of the 80,000 US soldiers left in Europe as assurance to NATO allies will most probably leave; Gates said in January 2011 that “it is clear that we have excess force structure in Europe”. The Balts and others in Europe who continue to fear possible trouble with Russia will wonder whether the US has enough forces ready to defend them. But their unease will be tempered by the many military exercises that the US held in the region last year. In 2010, Washington also successfully lobbied the rest of NATO to draft a defence plan for the Baltic. This was done in order to re-affirm US intent to uphold the alliance’s mutual defence pledge, and it seems to have worked: judging by mood at events such as this month’s GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava, the Balts and other Central Europeans are more at ease with Obama. Besides, as Stephen Flanagan of CSIS, a Washington think-tank, points out, “the 50,000 troops that will stay in Europe would be more than double the US ground presence in South Korea, where there is daily risk of imminent war.” Many of the new allies have been busy cutting defence budget themselves: they say that the fiscal crisis leaves them no choice, but the cuts also suggest that they feel little imminent threat from the East. This will make Washington less reticent about withdrawing troops from Europe.
Second, the military assistance that the US provides to help allies to modernise and re-arm will continue to fall. In the past decade, the US generously funded equipment purchases in Europe, with most money going to the new allies. Low-interest US loans allowed Poland to buy F-16 fighter jets, while Romania purchased C-130 cargo planes with US aid. But in recent years, assistance to countries such as Egypt or Pakistan has taken priority – of the $5.4 billion in 'foreign military financing', which the US set aside for 2011, $4.7 billion will go to Middle East and North Africa. The proportion of the aid going to wealthier and less strategic European countries will be slashed further when, as expected, the overall volume of military assistance falls. In the past, US defence companies would have had a decent shot at thwarting cuts in such assistance: they tend to be its main beneficiaries as most of the money ends up with them in the form of procurement orders. But the mood in the US is changing: Republicans in particular argue that the US government should not be in the business of funding new jobs, and that the best job-creation strategy lies in cutting expenses, thus restoring order in the federal budget. Should military assistance to Europe be slashed, as seems likely, programmes such as Romania’s planned purchase of F-16 fighter jets that are financed with US monies would likely be postponed or cancelled. With defence budgets falling in virtually all NATO countries, there is little hope that European allies would pick up the slack.
Third, US personnel on operations in Europe – in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo – will likely be reduced or withdrawn altogether. Because their numbers are low to begin with, the short-term impact will be minimal. Only 20 US soldiers remain in Bosnia in a force that once counted 20,000 American troops. The US has about 800 soldiers left in Kosovo, where the overall NATO force is being reduced from 14,000 to 2,500. Should a new crisis break out in the Balkans, the Pentagon will be able to send more soldiers from bases elsewhere in Europe (primarily Germany). But this reserve force too is being reduced. The downsized Pentagon will be far less willing than in the 1990s to lead military operations in Europe. In the future, Washington will look to its allies to assume main responsibility for dealing with the Balkans and other crises on Europe’s periphery. The defense department’s resistance to a no-fly zone in Libya could be a sign of things to come.
Fourth, those European companies that do business in the US will lose some of their orders – but so will their US competitors. Signs of renewed protectionism have been few so far. While the Pentagon recently chose Boeing over a Franco-German consortium EADS to build a new generation of tanker aircraft, “this is mainly because Boeing’s planes were $2 billion cheaper”, says Andrew Koch, an analyst with Scribe Strategies and Advisors, a Washington consultancy. The European companies have worked hard to erase their US competitors’ advantage: the likes of BAE Systems and EADS pledge to build equipment in the US using American workers, so they are likely to have as many members of Congress on their side as their US counterparts. While competition for US defence contracts will toughen, European companies are not necessarily losing ground to US ones.
Fifth, the future of new weapons funded jointly by the US and its allies is in doubt. Already, the Pentagon has announced that it was pulling out of a US-German-Italian project to build a new generation of medium-range missile defences. This is in large part because the project, MEADS, has suffered technical problems. But the Pentagon, in announcing the decision, also cited financial constraints as a factor. The more the US cuts defence spending, the higher the risk that NATO’s own flagship, continent-wide missile umbrella could be at risk. Announced in November 2010, the system envisions combining future US radars and missiles to be stationed mainly in Central Europe with yet-to-be-developed European sensors and interceptors. But few European governments have come forward pledging money for it. It is not obvious why the US Congress would fund a programme to defend European mainland, which the Europeans themselves are unwilling to support.
Politically, cuts in US defence spending are sure to rankle in Europe. A setback to NATO’s missile defences could be particularly divisive, with new allies lamenting a chance to host US military bases, and with NATO losing one of its key initiatives, which it also has been hoping to use to entice Russia into a closer relationship. The effect of US reductions will be compounded by cuts to military spending in Europe: there is a risk that reductions on one side of the Atlantic will be used to justify corresponding cuts across the sea. NATO remains the most powerful military block in the world but it will lose some of its ability to handle multiple crises simultaneously.
The main challenge for US and European defence communities for the next few years will be to keep NATO’s mutual defence pledge credible: this will require allies to prioritise missions and to hone their ability to diffuse crises before they require deployment of large forces. Even if no such crises occur, the Americans and Europeans will be busy managing the political fallout from cancelled procurement programmes and reduced operations. To minimise damage, the Pentagon should keep allies apprised of its cost-cutting measures. For their part, the Europeans need to co-ordinate better their own reductions in defence budgets, so as to make sure that enough money and resources are left to cover any shortfalls that US cuts will create.
Tomas Valasek is director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
The EU’s new politics of movement
by Hugo Brady
The freedom enjoyed by EU citizens to live and work in each others' countries is a unique liberty. It is the basis around which European governments have tried to build a single border, a compensatory system of co-operation between police, judges and immigration officers and a common refugee policy. But hardening attitudes towards immigration in many countries and widening policy disagreements between governments and the EU's institutions are exposing fault-lines in this structure. As the cracks threaten to widen over the coming months, policy-makers face some tricky dilemmas.
For a start, some EU governments are struggling with the very concept of free movement. The Dutch government – prodded by far-right politician and coalition kingmaker Geert Wilders – recently announced that it wants to renegotiate the free movement directive. At first sight, the Dutch demand does not seem that outrageous: change the law to allow governments to deport EU nationals with criminal records back to their home countries. The problem is that any re-opening of the 2004 directive risks sparking a plethora of demands from France, Italy or Britain to restrict free movement in other ways. The law was also at the centre of last year's spectacular row between the European Commission and France over arbitrary deportations of Roma. Poorer countries like Poland, Hungary or Romania would be livid, leading to a bitter split between east and west and, possibly, north and south.
Second, the Schengen area – the passport-free travel zone that incorporates most countries where free movement applies – is showing signs of strain. The most startling example of this is the partial takeover of Greece's border with Turkey by Frontex, the EU's border agency, due to a spike in illegal arrivals across the Evros river. Schengen is a bit like the euro, where countries share the benefits of a common good but largely trust each other to run a tight ship at home. However Greece already appears to view the Frontex mission as permanent, throwing up questions of moral hazard amid years of under-investment in its border services. With Italy appealing for similar intervention to help with migratory pressures from Tunisia, we could be witnessing the de facto creation of a European border guard. That development will take many EU countries by complete surprise.
Meanwhile, Bulgaria and Romania are adamant that they should join the Schengen area this year. But despite diplomatic bluster from both governments, neither is yet truly ready to cope with the kind of situation currently evident in Greece. For example, the Romanian port of Constanta risks becoming a Baltimore-on-the-Black Sea if traffickers and smugglers operating in the region can access the Schengen area there under current conditions: organised crime and corruption are commonplace. Moreover, Schengen entry is probably the last piece of leverage the EU has left to encourage both countries to cleanse corruption, reform their judiciaries and step up the fight against serious crime, as they solemnly promised to do in 2007. To argue that these issues are irrelevant to the maintenance of a common border is to dwell on niceties: they are all inherently linked to the rule of law.
Third, the EU's common asylum system is broken. Its cornerstone principle – that those fleeing persecution must apply for refugee status in whatever EU country they first reach – has been undermined by a recent judgement of the European Court of Human Rights on sub-standard refugee conditions in Greece.* The court exposed publically what governments and the European Commission already knew: despite the theoretical existence of common asylum rules, EU countries apply these more according to their national administrative traditions than the spirit of European law. Sadly, there is little agreement between Northern Europeans, the Mediterranean member-states or the Commission about what direction reform should take. While the Commission wants to raise standards and create some exceptions to the first-country-of-arrival rule, most governments oppose any liberalisation on the grounds of cost or moral hazard or both. Indeed the Netherlands wants the rules toughened to make it more, not less, difficult to claim refugee status; Sweden has tightened its own system in response to a rise in support for the far-right; and the UK has opted out of most of the new legislation proposed. This matters because no common border can work without an agreed approach to refugees: asylum seekers have special rights under international law to cross national frontiers. And with a fresh refugee crisis brewing in the EU's North African neighbourhood, it is imperative that the current system be replaced with something workable.
Fourth, the EU is about to embark on a complex and difficult debate about the sharing of police data across borders. EU countries have responded to the loss of control over their borders by creating ever more IT systems for sharing information like fingerprints, DNA records and criminal convictions. Later this year, Viviane Reding, the EU's justice commissioner, will unveil a robust new regime for protecting personal privacy in such cases, as well as an overall agreement with the US on data exchanged for the purposes of counter-terrorism and other serious crimes. The problem here is that the Commission is attempting to regulate the exchange of police files for the first time, using new powers under the Lisbon treaty. The issue is full of potential pitfalls. Given the disparity between national regimes for handling police data, an over-zealous proposal from the Commission would set it on a collision course with national security establishments across the EU and possibly provoke fresh tensions with the US. It is also questionable whether – as the Commission intends – a single EU system covering both commercial data and police records is feasible. It is important that information on private citizens shared across borders between police forces with different cultures and levels of professionalism is subject to credible restrictions. So too is the need for law enforcement bodies to work effectively together across borders. The Commission must exercise subtlety and good judgement.
The EU has a new politics of the interior. Failure to address any of the aforementioned issues correctly would undoubtedly have consequences for free movement and passport-free travel given the current political climate in Europe. It is no co-incidence that both France and the Netherlands have already recently attempted to step up police checks at their borders, in contravention of EU rules. As with the original system underpinning fiscal stability in the eurozone, some EU policies to do with border management, refugee protection and police co-operation were poorly designed. Their consequences, flaws and inherent contradictions will trigger much political and diplomatic confrontation in the months ahead. Many will say this is healthy: policies that have hitherto enjoyed years of cozy consensus and relative anonymity are now subject to proper scrutiny and debate. That is true enough. But the battles ahead are not for the faint-hearted.
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the centre for European Reform
* M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=880339&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
The freedom enjoyed by EU citizens to live and work in each others' countries is a unique liberty. It is the basis around which European governments have tried to build a single border, a compensatory system of co-operation between police, judges and immigration officers and a common refugee policy. But hardening attitudes towards immigration in many countries and widening policy disagreements between governments and the EU's institutions are exposing fault-lines in this structure. As the cracks threaten to widen over the coming months, policy-makers face some tricky dilemmas.
For a start, some EU governments are struggling with the very concept of free movement. The Dutch government – prodded by far-right politician and coalition kingmaker Geert Wilders – recently announced that it wants to renegotiate the free movement directive. At first sight, the Dutch demand does not seem that outrageous: change the law to allow governments to deport EU nationals with criminal records back to their home countries. The problem is that any re-opening of the 2004 directive risks sparking a plethora of demands from France, Italy or Britain to restrict free movement in other ways. The law was also at the centre of last year's spectacular row between the European Commission and France over arbitrary deportations of Roma. Poorer countries like Poland, Hungary or Romania would be livid, leading to a bitter split between east and west and, possibly, north and south.
Second, the Schengen area – the passport-free travel zone that incorporates most countries where free movement applies – is showing signs of strain. The most startling example of this is the partial takeover of Greece's border with Turkey by Frontex, the EU's border agency, due to a spike in illegal arrivals across the Evros river. Schengen is a bit like the euro, where countries share the benefits of a common good but largely trust each other to run a tight ship at home. However Greece already appears to view the Frontex mission as permanent, throwing up questions of moral hazard amid years of under-investment in its border services. With Italy appealing for similar intervention to help with migratory pressures from Tunisia, we could be witnessing the de facto creation of a European border guard. That development will take many EU countries by complete surprise.
Meanwhile, Bulgaria and Romania are adamant that they should join the Schengen area this year. But despite diplomatic bluster from both governments, neither is yet truly ready to cope with the kind of situation currently evident in Greece. For example, the Romanian port of Constanta risks becoming a Baltimore-on-the-Black Sea if traffickers and smugglers operating in the region can access the Schengen area there under current conditions: organised crime and corruption are commonplace. Moreover, Schengen entry is probably the last piece of leverage the EU has left to encourage both countries to cleanse corruption, reform their judiciaries and step up the fight against serious crime, as they solemnly promised to do in 2007. To argue that these issues are irrelevant to the maintenance of a common border is to dwell on niceties: they are all inherently linked to the rule of law.
Third, the EU's common asylum system is broken. Its cornerstone principle – that those fleeing persecution must apply for refugee status in whatever EU country they first reach – has been undermined by a recent judgement of the European Court of Human Rights on sub-standard refugee conditions in Greece.* The court exposed publically what governments and the European Commission already knew: despite the theoretical existence of common asylum rules, EU countries apply these more according to their national administrative traditions than the spirit of European law. Sadly, there is little agreement between Northern Europeans, the Mediterranean member-states or the Commission about what direction reform should take. While the Commission wants to raise standards and create some exceptions to the first-country-of-arrival rule, most governments oppose any liberalisation on the grounds of cost or moral hazard or both. Indeed the Netherlands wants the rules toughened to make it more, not less, difficult to claim refugee status; Sweden has tightened its own system in response to a rise in support for the far-right; and the UK has opted out of most of the new legislation proposed. This matters because no common border can work without an agreed approach to refugees: asylum seekers have special rights under international law to cross national frontiers. And with a fresh refugee crisis brewing in the EU's North African neighbourhood, it is imperative that the current system be replaced with something workable.
Fourth, the EU is about to embark on a complex and difficult debate about the sharing of police data across borders. EU countries have responded to the loss of control over their borders by creating ever more IT systems for sharing information like fingerprints, DNA records and criminal convictions. Later this year, Viviane Reding, the EU's justice commissioner, will unveil a robust new regime for protecting personal privacy in such cases, as well as an overall agreement with the US on data exchanged for the purposes of counter-terrorism and other serious crimes. The problem here is that the Commission is attempting to regulate the exchange of police files for the first time, using new powers under the Lisbon treaty. The issue is full of potential pitfalls. Given the disparity between national regimes for handling police data, an over-zealous proposal from the Commission would set it on a collision course with national security establishments across the EU and possibly provoke fresh tensions with the US. It is also questionable whether – as the Commission intends – a single EU system covering both commercial data and police records is feasible. It is important that information on private citizens shared across borders between police forces with different cultures and levels of professionalism is subject to credible restrictions. So too is the need for law enforcement bodies to work effectively together across borders. The Commission must exercise subtlety and good judgement.
The EU has a new politics of the interior. Failure to address any of the aforementioned issues correctly would undoubtedly have consequences for free movement and passport-free travel given the current political climate in Europe. It is no co-incidence that both France and the Netherlands have already recently attempted to step up police checks at their borders, in contravention of EU rules. As with the original system underpinning fiscal stability in the eurozone, some EU policies to do with border management, refugee protection and police co-operation were poorly designed. Their consequences, flaws and inherent contradictions will trigger much political and diplomatic confrontation in the months ahead. Many will say this is healthy: policies that have hitherto enjoyed years of cozy consensus and relative anonymity are now subject to proper scrutiny and debate. That is true enough. But the battles ahead are not for the faint-hearted.
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the centre for European Reform
* M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=880339&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
Friday, February 11, 2011
Eurozone governance and the Berlin consensus
by Philip Whyte
A broad consensus appears to have emerged across northern Europe on what ails the eurozone. The region's current predicament, on this view, is the result of fecklessness and irresponsibility in geographically peripheral member-states. Countries in the periphery ran into difficulty because they mismanaged their public finances and lost 'competitiveness'. The road to redemption, on this analysis, is for the peripheral countries to consolidate their public finances and embrace supply-side reforms. The task at EU level is to keep member-states on the straight and narrow by making sure that they comply with the fiscal rules and do what is required to remain 'competitive'. This view, which is having a decisive influence on reforms to the way the eurozone is run, coincides with that of the German government. Let us, then, call it the 'Berlin consensus'.
As an analysis of what ails numerous economies across Europe, the Berlin consensus has much to commend it. There is no question that some countries have mismanaged their public finances. Greece, where governments disguised their profligacy by cooking the data, is the most egregious example. Nor is there any question that many 'peripherals', particularly across Southern Europe, face daunting supply-side challenges: low productivity, high drop-out rates from secondary education, inflexible labour markets, insufficient competition in services markets, rapidly ageing populations and low effective ages of retirement are a toxic brew. All these countries are on unsustainable paths and must push through thoroughgoing economic reforms. Depressingly, their reform efforts have been among the most pedestrian in the EU.
So far, so uncontroversial. Is it right, however, to say that the eurozone would have averted crisis if countries had complied with the Stability and Growth Pact and taken the Lisbon agenda of economic reforms more seriously? Nothing is less certain. France and Germany, which violated the Stability and Growth Pact in 2004, do not face funding difficulties in the government bond markets; Ireland and Spain, which complied with the rules until the crisis broke, do. Nor is it clear that macroeconomic imbalances can be pinned on divergences in national 'competitiveness'. Ireland, a flexible economy that scores highly on many indicators of 'competitiveness', is arguably the most troubled (because the most indebted) country in the eurozone. Italy, which scores worse than Ireland on most indicators of competitiveness, is far less indebted.
The problem with the Berlin consensus is that it does not pay enough attention to the demand-side factors that gave rise to the crisis. The cause of the eurozone's macroeconomic imbalances lay on the demand side. In essence, the problem was that demand grew broadly in line with output at eurozone level, but failed to do so at national level. While demand grew faster than output in the periphery, the reverse was the case in the 'core'. Profligacy in the periphery was funded by thrift in the core. This arrangement suited both sides – for a while. Countries in the periphery enjoyed debt-fuelled booms, while countries like Germany could rely on exports to keep growing (in the face of weak demand at home). Export-led growth in the core and rising indebtedness in the periphery were linked: they were reverse sides of the same coin.
Given the amount of capital that was flooding into the deficit countries, there was always a risk that some of it would be wasted on unproductive investments. And so it was. In Greece, the main agent of waste was the government. But the antics of the government in Greece pale in comparison with those of the private sector elsewhere. In Spain and Ireland, the private sector misallocated capital on a truly epic scale. The agents were over-leveraged banks, in both peripheral and core countries, that funded increasingly speculative investments in the property sector. When the property bubble burst and banks' assets turned sour, the direct and indirect costs blew a hole in the public finance. Ireland's deficits and debt exploded because the government guaranteed the liabilities of highly leveraged banks that were too big for the state to save.
At root, the eurozone crisis boils down to an argument about money. Who should pick up the bill for all the capital that was misallocated in the peripheral countries: feckless borrowers, or reckless lenders? Creditor countries, who are currently in the political driving seat, believe the bill should fall on taxpayers in the deficit countries. But it is not clear that this demand is viable – either economically or politically. Some countries in the periphery are probably insolvent, and the medicine they are currently being prescribed risks pushing them into an ever deeper debt trap. It is hard to see how governments in the periphery can indefinitely push through structural reforms if their economies are contracting and their debt burdens are rising. In the end, therefore, some element of forbearance in the creditor countries appears to be inevitable.
What bearing does all this have for the reform of eurozone governance? First, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in the periphery may be desirable objectives, but they will not restore the most indebted countries to solvency. Second, extending loans on less than generous terms, as Ireland's partners are doing, will buy time but is unlikely to stave off the inevitable: a default on, or restructuring of, peripheral government debt. Third, it is wrong to portray the eurozone crisis as a problem in the periphery alone. The sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis are inextricably inter-twined. In the peripheral countries, the link is overt. In the core countries it is suppressed. German banks, for example, are under-capitalised and highly exposed to default in the periphery – a fact that the German government is not keen to discuss.
Since a sovereign debt restructuring in the periphery would have repercussions for the solvency of banks in the core, the eurozone needs a crisis management framework to deal with both eventualities. The eurozone needs to establish a framework for orderly sovereign debt restructuring, which would ensure that private-sector creditors share in the pain. And since sovereign debt restructuring would push some European banks into insolvency, the EU needs to develop plans for dealing with this prospect. Solvent sovereigns in the core, such as Germany, will have to decide whether they want to recapitalise their weaker banks, or allow them to survive in their current vegetative state. And countries across the EU must implement resolution regimes that would allow them to wind up insolvent banks in as orderly a fashion as possible.
Philip Whyte is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
A broad consensus appears to have emerged across northern Europe on what ails the eurozone. The region's current predicament, on this view, is the result of fecklessness and irresponsibility in geographically peripheral member-states. Countries in the periphery ran into difficulty because they mismanaged their public finances and lost 'competitiveness'. The road to redemption, on this analysis, is for the peripheral countries to consolidate their public finances and embrace supply-side reforms. The task at EU level is to keep member-states on the straight and narrow by making sure that they comply with the fiscal rules and do what is required to remain 'competitive'. This view, which is having a decisive influence on reforms to the way the eurozone is run, coincides with that of the German government. Let us, then, call it the 'Berlin consensus'.
As an analysis of what ails numerous economies across Europe, the Berlin consensus has much to commend it. There is no question that some countries have mismanaged their public finances. Greece, where governments disguised their profligacy by cooking the data, is the most egregious example. Nor is there any question that many 'peripherals', particularly across Southern Europe, face daunting supply-side challenges: low productivity, high drop-out rates from secondary education, inflexible labour markets, insufficient competition in services markets, rapidly ageing populations and low effective ages of retirement are a toxic brew. All these countries are on unsustainable paths and must push through thoroughgoing economic reforms. Depressingly, their reform efforts have been among the most pedestrian in the EU.
So far, so uncontroversial. Is it right, however, to say that the eurozone would have averted crisis if countries had complied with the Stability and Growth Pact and taken the Lisbon agenda of economic reforms more seriously? Nothing is less certain. France and Germany, which violated the Stability and Growth Pact in 2004, do not face funding difficulties in the government bond markets; Ireland and Spain, which complied with the rules until the crisis broke, do. Nor is it clear that macroeconomic imbalances can be pinned on divergences in national 'competitiveness'. Ireland, a flexible economy that scores highly on many indicators of 'competitiveness', is arguably the most troubled (because the most indebted) country in the eurozone. Italy, which scores worse than Ireland on most indicators of competitiveness, is far less indebted.
The problem with the Berlin consensus is that it does not pay enough attention to the demand-side factors that gave rise to the crisis. The cause of the eurozone's macroeconomic imbalances lay on the demand side. In essence, the problem was that demand grew broadly in line with output at eurozone level, but failed to do so at national level. While demand grew faster than output in the periphery, the reverse was the case in the 'core'. Profligacy in the periphery was funded by thrift in the core. This arrangement suited both sides – for a while. Countries in the periphery enjoyed debt-fuelled booms, while countries like Germany could rely on exports to keep growing (in the face of weak demand at home). Export-led growth in the core and rising indebtedness in the periphery were linked: they were reverse sides of the same coin.
Given the amount of capital that was flooding into the deficit countries, there was always a risk that some of it would be wasted on unproductive investments. And so it was. In Greece, the main agent of waste was the government. But the antics of the government in Greece pale in comparison with those of the private sector elsewhere. In Spain and Ireland, the private sector misallocated capital on a truly epic scale. The agents were over-leveraged banks, in both peripheral and core countries, that funded increasingly speculative investments in the property sector. When the property bubble burst and banks' assets turned sour, the direct and indirect costs blew a hole in the public finance. Ireland's deficits and debt exploded because the government guaranteed the liabilities of highly leveraged banks that were too big for the state to save.
At root, the eurozone crisis boils down to an argument about money. Who should pick up the bill for all the capital that was misallocated in the peripheral countries: feckless borrowers, or reckless lenders? Creditor countries, who are currently in the political driving seat, believe the bill should fall on taxpayers in the deficit countries. But it is not clear that this demand is viable – either economically or politically. Some countries in the periphery are probably insolvent, and the medicine they are currently being prescribed risks pushing them into an ever deeper debt trap. It is hard to see how governments in the periphery can indefinitely push through structural reforms if their economies are contracting and their debt burdens are rising. In the end, therefore, some element of forbearance in the creditor countries appears to be inevitable.
What bearing does all this have for the reform of eurozone governance? First, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in the periphery may be desirable objectives, but they will not restore the most indebted countries to solvency. Second, extending loans on less than generous terms, as Ireland's partners are doing, will buy time but is unlikely to stave off the inevitable: a default on, or restructuring of, peripheral government debt. Third, it is wrong to portray the eurozone crisis as a problem in the periphery alone. The sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis are inextricably inter-twined. In the peripheral countries, the link is overt. In the core countries it is suppressed. German banks, for example, are under-capitalised and highly exposed to default in the periphery – a fact that the German government is not keen to discuss.
Since a sovereign debt restructuring in the periphery would have repercussions for the solvency of banks in the core, the eurozone needs a crisis management framework to deal with both eventualities. The eurozone needs to establish a framework for orderly sovereign debt restructuring, which would ensure that private-sector creditors share in the pain. And since sovereign debt restructuring would push some European banks into insolvency, the EU needs to develop plans for dealing with this prospect. Solvent sovereigns in the core, such as Germany, will have to decide whether they want to recapitalise their weaker banks, or allow them to survive in their current vegetative state. And countries across the EU must implement resolution regimes that would allow them to wind up insolvent banks in as orderly a fashion as possible.
Philip Whyte is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
Friday, January 28, 2011
Ireland’s election and the EU: From poster child to enfant terrible?
by Hugo Brady
Ireland will elect a new government on February 25th to replace a discredited administration loathed by most Irish voters. At first sight, it seems unlikely the election will re-open the fundamentals of a bail-out agreed with fellow eurozone members and the IMF last November. The last act of Fianna Fáil, the main party in government since 1997, was to translate the terms of that deal into an initial set of tax hikes and further public spending cuts before leaving office. Nonetheless, the poll – Ireland’s most important for decades – marks a shift in hostility towards the bail-out and the EU in general which its partners would be foolish to ignore.
European benefactors might express shock that Irish attitudes towards the EU have worsened in the wake of the bail-out. To many EU leaders – including José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission – they are helping to rescue a country where politicians and regulators, through incompetence or worse, allowed bankers and developers to drive the economy to ruin using other people's money.* That view is correct but cloistered. It takes no account of the part played by the introduction of the euro itself – at a low interest rate hitherto unknown in Ireland – in inflating a runaway property boom. And Ireland's eurozone partners (along with Britain) do expect their money back at a profit, having – they hope – secured the common currency and the unwise investments of their own banks in the process.
Furthermore, the Irish version of events differs sharply from that of its partners, even when adjusted for the natural reluctance of any country to blame itself for its own woes. Most Irish people feel that the rest of the eurozone and European Central Bank imposed a bail-out that their country did not need (Ireland could have limped on until mid-2011 despite its astronomical debts) at an interest rate that it could not afford (5.8 per cent) in an ultimately futile attempt to contain a wider crisis. With a decade of austerity ahead and with no option to default, Ireland's voters gape in disbelief at new demands by continental politicians that it must now raise its low corporation tax rate. By the end of the year, Ireland will have lost 300,000 jobs from a labour market of 2.1 million. The country needs to retain foreign investment as a matter of economic survival.
Perhaps popular disenchantment was always unavoidable, but attitudes amongst Ireland's traditionally pro-EU elites have hardened too. Michael Noonan, the finance spokesperson of Fine Gael – an unambiguously pro-European Christian Democratic party and the one likely to form the bulk of the next government – has characterised the bail-out agreement as being forced on a punch-drunk government by lordly EU and IMF negotiators. Eamon Gilmore, the Irish Labour leader, whose party is likely to secure the finance portfolio in a new coalition, has also demanded a renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, saying the bail-out “clearly won't work. It provides no scope for the Irish economy to grow.”** Even Fianna Fáil – now under a far more effective leader in Micheál Martin, the former foreign affairs minster – will repudiate the agreement in time. And independent commentators in the media and respected think-tanks such as the Economic and Social Research Institute wonder aloud how Ireland will remain a euro country while extricating itself from its current situation.
Irish politics manages to fuse an Italian-style localism, ebullience and idiosyncrasy with the British parliamentary model. Ireland's politicians are usually uninterested in ideology, intensely sensitive to local concerns and poor at strategic thinking, one reason why they were unable to think past the boom. But popular Irish attitudes to national sovereignty closely mirror those of its nearest neighbour. In Britain, euroscepticism became a truly potent political force in the wake of the UK's forced exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Since then, pro-Europeans in Britain have dwindled to a small group of progressives. There is every reason to believe that the new generation of Irish politicians entering the scene at this election will view Ireland's difficulties with the euro as the ERM crisis for slow-learners. A flotilla of long-serving parliamentarians are bowing out of politics at this election in favour of younger candidates.
All of this matters doubly because – unlike Britain – Ireland has held a referendum on the future of European integration on average every four or five years since 1987. On the two occasions when Ireland has voted twice on the same treaty, Irish politicians were able to justify this by pointing to the fact that EU membership had been overwhelmingly beneficial to the country. Many voters now recall with bitterness how a desperate government assured them in October 2009 that a second vote on the Lisbon treaty would assist an imminent economic recovery. It will no longer be possible to be so categorial about Ireland's relationship with the EU, also bearing in mind that the country will shortly become a net contributor to the European budget. And the current uncertainty over the fate of the euro itself shows that the EU's constitutional future is by no means settled, as many had hoped when Lisbon was finally ratified.
Make no mistake: it is Ireland's politicians, not the EU, that will rightly be in the firing line on February 25th. But although Ireland may never again be able to serve as an unqualified European success story, the collapse of pro-European sentiment there could well come back to haunt the EU in future. In the 1990s, the IMF learned in Latin America that it is often wise to launch a charm offensive when a new government comes into power in a recipient country undergoing harsh economic adjustment. Ireland's eurozone partners and the ECB would be well advised to follow a similar approach by pre-empting the incoming government's demand for a renegotiation with an offer to lower the interest rate for loans needed to sustain the public finances. In time, the sparing of Irish blushes may save those of many others.
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
* http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2011/0119/breaking52.html
** http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0106/1224286876810.html
Ireland will elect a new government on February 25th to replace a discredited administration loathed by most Irish voters. At first sight, it seems unlikely the election will re-open the fundamentals of a bail-out agreed with fellow eurozone members and the IMF last November. The last act of Fianna Fáil, the main party in government since 1997, was to translate the terms of that deal into an initial set of tax hikes and further public spending cuts before leaving office. Nonetheless, the poll – Ireland’s most important for decades – marks a shift in hostility towards the bail-out and the EU in general which its partners would be foolish to ignore.
European benefactors might express shock that Irish attitudes towards the EU have worsened in the wake of the bail-out. To many EU leaders – including José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission – they are helping to rescue a country where politicians and regulators, through incompetence or worse, allowed bankers and developers to drive the economy to ruin using other people's money.* That view is correct but cloistered. It takes no account of the part played by the introduction of the euro itself – at a low interest rate hitherto unknown in Ireland – in inflating a runaway property boom. And Ireland's eurozone partners (along with Britain) do expect their money back at a profit, having – they hope – secured the common currency and the unwise investments of their own banks in the process.
Furthermore, the Irish version of events differs sharply from that of its partners, even when adjusted for the natural reluctance of any country to blame itself for its own woes. Most Irish people feel that the rest of the eurozone and European Central Bank imposed a bail-out that their country did not need (Ireland could have limped on until mid-2011 despite its astronomical debts) at an interest rate that it could not afford (5.8 per cent) in an ultimately futile attempt to contain a wider crisis. With a decade of austerity ahead and with no option to default, Ireland's voters gape in disbelief at new demands by continental politicians that it must now raise its low corporation tax rate. By the end of the year, Ireland will have lost 300,000 jobs from a labour market of 2.1 million. The country needs to retain foreign investment as a matter of economic survival.
Perhaps popular disenchantment was always unavoidable, but attitudes amongst Ireland's traditionally pro-EU elites have hardened too. Michael Noonan, the finance spokesperson of Fine Gael – an unambiguously pro-European Christian Democratic party and the one likely to form the bulk of the next government – has characterised the bail-out agreement as being forced on a punch-drunk government by lordly EU and IMF negotiators. Eamon Gilmore, the Irish Labour leader, whose party is likely to secure the finance portfolio in a new coalition, has also demanded a renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, saying the bail-out “clearly won't work. It provides no scope for the Irish economy to grow.”** Even Fianna Fáil – now under a far more effective leader in Micheál Martin, the former foreign affairs minster – will repudiate the agreement in time. And independent commentators in the media and respected think-tanks such as the Economic and Social Research Institute wonder aloud how Ireland will remain a euro country while extricating itself from its current situation.
Irish politics manages to fuse an Italian-style localism, ebullience and idiosyncrasy with the British parliamentary model. Ireland's politicians are usually uninterested in ideology, intensely sensitive to local concerns and poor at strategic thinking, one reason why they were unable to think past the boom. But popular Irish attitudes to national sovereignty closely mirror those of its nearest neighbour. In Britain, euroscepticism became a truly potent political force in the wake of the UK's forced exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Since then, pro-Europeans in Britain have dwindled to a small group of progressives. There is every reason to believe that the new generation of Irish politicians entering the scene at this election will view Ireland's difficulties with the euro as the ERM crisis for slow-learners. A flotilla of long-serving parliamentarians are bowing out of politics at this election in favour of younger candidates.
All of this matters doubly because – unlike Britain – Ireland has held a referendum on the future of European integration on average every four or five years since 1987. On the two occasions when Ireland has voted twice on the same treaty, Irish politicians were able to justify this by pointing to the fact that EU membership had been overwhelmingly beneficial to the country. Many voters now recall with bitterness how a desperate government assured them in October 2009 that a second vote on the Lisbon treaty would assist an imminent economic recovery. It will no longer be possible to be so categorial about Ireland's relationship with the EU, also bearing in mind that the country will shortly become a net contributor to the European budget. And the current uncertainty over the fate of the euro itself shows that the EU's constitutional future is by no means settled, as many had hoped when Lisbon was finally ratified.
Make no mistake: it is Ireland's politicians, not the EU, that will rightly be in the firing line on February 25th. But although Ireland may never again be able to serve as an unqualified European success story, the collapse of pro-European sentiment there could well come back to haunt the EU in future. In the 1990s, the IMF learned in Latin America that it is often wise to launch a charm offensive when a new government comes into power in a recipient country undergoing harsh economic adjustment. Ireland's eurozone partners and the ECB would be well advised to follow a similar approach by pre-empting the incoming government's demand for a renegotiation with an offer to lower the interest rate for loans needed to sustain the public finances. In time, the sparing of Irish blushes may save those of many others.
Hugo Brady is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform
* http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2011/0119/breaking52.html
** http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0106/1224286876810.html
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